'Big lessons from the faulty analysis that spiked the Shanghai stock market' -   

ProTips from Andrew Polk, Trivium China

By Malcolm Riddell · May 11, 2018

Greetings and welcome back!

On April 24, equity analysts interpreted a phrase used in a Politburo meeting readout to signal a new round of economic stimulus. And, the Shanghai stock market, one of the world's worst performers, spiked 2%.

On April 25, having much earlier advised and protected clients, Andrew Polk of Trivium China published an analysis in Trivium's daily (and free) 'Tip Sheet' that explained why the market had gotten the signal wrong - there was no stimulus coming.

Later, Andrew and I talked about how he reached his conclusions. His explanation is a masterclass in how experience, discipline, and some tedious slogging, combined with a sound analytical framework, lead to good China analysis.

Keep reading and learn from one the top China analysts at work today. By the time you finish, your own analytical prowess will have been enhanced. Mine was.

Let me know what you think.

All the best,

Malcolm

Please invite your friends and colleagues to join the conversation.

Tell me anything on your mind about China, including what you think about what you are reading here.

Just reply to this email, or reach me at malcolm.riddell@riddell-tseng.com

Watch Andrew Polk's analysis of

'What everyone got wrong about the Politburo meeting'  (5:57)

1. The Politiburo speaks, the market spikes

source: CNBC 

Words move markets. Investors, traders, and analysts scrutinize every comment made by the U.S. Federal Reserve. And, how they interpret these comments moves markets. Sometimes up, sometimes down, sometimes both in the same day.

Parsing the Politburo. In China, where policy and economics are even more tightly intertwined, readouts from Politburo meetings are even more carefully parsed for clues that indicate changes in how the economy is going to be managed. And, how these are parsed likewise moves markets.

Getting the Poliburo wrong. Over time, phrases in Politburo readouts become associated with specific policy changes. So, when you see a certain phrase, you interpret this as a signal. Unless...

1. The phrase has lost its connotation or taken on a new one, or
2. The phrase is mechanically pulled out from a context that strips the expected connotation from the phrase.

• Either way, you get what the Politburo meant wrong.

 Case in point. Andrew Polk of Trivium China: 'The Politburo - China’s 25 highest-ranking politicians -  held its monthly meeting on April 23 and discussed Q1 economic performance and the policy outlook.'

• ''When the readout from the meeting came out, the markets got really excited because the readout included the phrase, "We need to expand domestic demand."'

• 'Under the Hu-Wen administration that phrase used to be a very clear signal of coming stimulative measures for economic activity.'

• 'So, everyone jumped on that and said, "Oh, it looks like the Chinese top leaders are going back to the stimulus playbook of the Hu-Wen era and are looking to expand domestic demand again."'
• 'And, the Shanghai composite jolted in reaction – up 2% on Tuesday, April 24, the biggest one-day jump so far in 2018.'
  

The excitement. An example from Bloomberg, April 24: 'China Stocks Get Adrenaline Shot From Policy Easing Signals.'

• 'Chinese stocks got a much-needed shot in the arm Tuesday, gaining the most in two months amid signs the government is willing to ease its tightening campaign to avoid an overly sharp economic slowdown.'
• 'The rally followed a meeting where policy makers mentioned the need to boost domestic demand for the first time since 2015, and dropped a reference to deleveraging.'
• '“The Politburo meeting sends a signal that China may roll out fiscal stimulus and supportive monetary policies to resolve financial risk and stabilize markets,” said Ken Chen, a Shanghai-based analyst with KGI Securities Co. “That has boosted sentiment on the market, especially for blue chips.”'
• Mr. Chen's analysis was echoed by many other equity analysts.

 The problem. Mr. Chen and the other analysts were wrong about what the Politburo meant. Andrew explains.

2. How to parse Politburo pronouncements

source: South China Morning Post 

Andrew: '"We need to expand domestic demand" has been a buzzword or buzzphrase, if you like, in China signaling stimulus is coming.'

• 'Analysts saw it in the Politburo meeting readout and said, "That's what they used to mean when they said this, and so it must mean that again."
• 'They didn't realize the nature of that phrase has changed over the past five or six years.'
• 'The analysts should have done a more careful reading.'

'Careful reading.' How do you do a careful reading? Andrew and Trivium China show you three steps:

1. Trace the 'etymology' of the phrase.
2. Check the context where the phrase is used.
3. Consider what makes sense. 

 1. Trace the 'etymology' of the phrase 

 'We went back and read through all the Politburo readouts from the economic meetings, which take place generally in April and December, and it was pretty clear by reading those how that phrase had evolved over the past few years.'

 'We found that the Politburo hadn't used the term "to expand domestic demand" since late 2013.'

• 'And, we saw that the last couple of times that they just used the term "domestic demand," or even "increasing domestic demand," it wasn't followed soon by stimulus.'

'In fact, the last time the Politburo used that exact phrase -  "We need to expand domestic demand" - was in December 2013.' 

• 'The next time 'domestic demand' was mentioned was in April 2014. And, it was still seven months until stimulus started.'
• 'Then, in November 2014, the PBoC embarked on an easing cycle that included six cuts to benchmark interest rates over the course of 12 months, for a total reduction of 165 basis points in the key lending rate – and the Politburo never once talked about “increasing domestic demand” during that period.'

'By tracing the history of how the phrase has been used, we could see that it hasn't really meant stimulus since Xi Jinping has taken power. So there's no real reason to read that new phrasing as stimulative.'

2.Check the context where the phrase is used

'So, despite the initial stock market reaction, the Politburo statement is much less than meets the eye for several reasons':

• 'The actual key message from the readout was to underscore the “three tough battles” as policy priorities in 2018 – i.e. addressing financial risks, fighting pollution, and alleviating poverty. So risk containment is still top dog.'
  
• 'The bit about “expanding domestic demand” comes at the end of a long sentence listing a host of priorities, which also included keeping fiscal policy “constant” and monetary policy “neutral.”'
  
• 'While the Politburo hasn’t used the term “domestic demand” for several years, it has often identified the need to “expand aggregate demand.” They used that phrase four different times in 2016, and once in 2017. Those mentions were not followed by stimulus.'
  
• 'The replacement of “aggregate demand” with “domestic demand” is all about the looming trade war. Policymakers are rightly concerned that trade tensions may have a major effect on growth. If that is the case, they will try to offset those negative effects.'

'When we saw how the phrase was used in the context of the entire Politburo readout, it was pretty clear that they didn't have stimulus in mind.'

3.Consider what reading makes sense 

'Standing ready to support the economy in the face of a potential trade war is a far cry from pump-priming credit and investment to stave off an organic economic slowdown.'

'Taking the entirety of the Politburo statement together, then, it is pretty clear that Xi Jinping was saying “we will support growth in response to a trade war if we have to, but we are mostly still focused on risk containment.”'

• 'Top policymakers see that the economy is broadly slowing, but so far they are still comfortable with the current growth range, especially on the nominal side.'

'But, even if the Politburo did mean, "We're going to do some stimulus activity," it's unclear to me where exactly that stimulative activity would come from.'

'When analysts were saying, "This is a signal that macro policy is loosening," I ask them, "What would the stimulus look like right now?"'

• 'China is pretty much maxed out on the fiscal side.'
• 'With deposit rates at just 1.5% – already a negative real yield thanks to inflation at 2.1% – the PBoC does not have room to cut on the monetary front.'
• 'Moreover, they're trying to contain the big markets in real estate right now, so there's really is no room to cut interest rates.'
• 'Interbank rates are currently elevated, and there's a tightening cycle in the US, so a marked acceleration in credit growth just doesn’t seem feasible.'
• 'So, with the financial derisking that's going on - and financial derisking was clearly underlined in the Politburo readout - they can't really boost bank lending at the same time that they're trying to get banks to reduce interbank activity and keep bank funding tight.'

'If analysts had stepped back to consider what makes sense, they would have seen that China doesn't have any good options to stimulate the economy now, even if it wanted to.'

The bottom line

'The bottom line: There is no stimulus coming.'

• The analysts and then the market got it wrong.
• Why? 'I think it was a bit of a lazy reading of "We need to expand domestic demand."'

And, how.

3. 'China watching': then & now

Andrew shows the kind of careful analysis needed to approach a correct interpretation of Chinese official pronouncements. But, at least today there are official pronouncements. 

When I was CIA case officer in China Operations - that is, a spy not an analyst - I'd see my colleagues in the Soviet/East European Division pulling their hair out trying to figure out what a photo meant.

• Not a picture of a Red Army missile site - a picture of the old guys standing on the rostrum at the May Day Parade.
• What their order in line meant, who was in, who was out, and so on.
• That's one of the ways they tried to get a handle on what was happening in the closed, authoritarian Soviet Union.
• In the trade (and later commonly), we called it 'Kremlinology.'
• China, for 'China watchers,' was just as opaque. Maybe even more so. We didn't have as many revealing photos and speeches.
  

Here's a quote from the CIA's now declassified, 'The Art of China Watching,' written in the mid-1970's, not long before I joined China Operations.

• 'It is no semantic accident that observers of the Chinese political scene are more often called "China-watchers" than "Sinologists," while analysts of the Soviet Union are frequently referred to as "Kremlinologists."'
• 'The art of China-watching is imprecise at best, and hardly deserves yet to be called Sinology.' 
• 'The explanation, or blame, for this often frustrating situation lies mainly with the way the Chinese conduct their affairs. To say the Chinese have a penchant for secrecy is almost an understatement.'

While much has changed in China since then, the 'penchant for secrecy' hasn't. And, 'the art of China watching' is still 'imprecise at best.'

As Andrew has shown, 'China watchers' today, especially in the form of equity analysts, look at words not pictures. 

• What does a phrase used in an official pronouncement signal?
• How was it used in the past, and when it was, what happened?
• Has the phrase taken on a new meaning, and therefore has become a signal of some new outcome?

Parsing meaning in this way is just as challenging - and imprecise - as analyzing a photo. And, when analysts get it wrong, markets move just as much as when they get it right.

Andrew was formerly director of China research at Medley Global Advisors and senior China economist at The Conference Board China Center for Economics and Business in Beijing.

Previously, he worked at the Institute of International Finance, where he conducted macroeconomic analysis on emerging markets in the Asia/Pacific region. His research focus has included monetary policy, capital flows, and financial market development throughout East and Southeast Asia, with a particular emphasis on China. He has also conducted growth and inflation forecasting and country risk analysis for the region.

He has held research positions at the East Asia Desk of the U.S. Treasury Department, the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, and Foreign Policy magazine.

Andrew earned his BA in American studies and communication at Texas A&M University and holds an MA with distinction in economics and China studies from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.

Thank you for reading!

Please send me your thoughts at malcolm.riddell@riddell-tseng.com

Until next time,

Malcolm 

New super-agency, National Supervision Commission - and China's massive  government restructuring 

By Malcolm Riddell · April 24, 2018

 Greetings and welcome back!

'Government restructuring is the most immediate outcome of the "Two Sessions" - the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference followed by the National People's Congress - this March,' Andrew Polk of Trivium China told in our recent conversation.

'We're talking about basically a total overhaul of the government. It's huge. It's momentous. And it's just started.'

'With government restructuring, the biggest thing is the creation of an entirely new branch of government: the National Supervisory Commission. Its entire job is to overlook every single public official in China. It is an institutionalization and deepening of the corruption crackdown that we've seen over the past few years.'

'The NSC not only institutionalizes the corruption crackdown, but it also makes sure that the discipline inspectors are now more and more involved in policy implementation. And, when the discipline inspectors get involved, lo and behold, things happen quickly.'

In all, Andrew highlighted four major actions from the Two Sessions:

1. Chinese government restructuring 
   
2. The policy roadmap 
   
3. Personnel 
   
4. The legislative agenda + the constitutional amendments 

 Today, we'll cover Andrew's thought on the first action, 'Government restructuring,' as well as its most important outcome, the new, super-agency, the National Supervision Commission.

Watch out for more of Andrew Polk's analysis of the other three major actions - coming soon.

All the best,

Malcolm

Please invite your friends and colleagues to join the conversation.

Tell me anything on your mind about China, including what you think about what you are reading here.

Just reply to this email, or reach me at malcolm.riddell@riddell-tseng.com

Watch Andrew Polk's analysis of

Chinese government restructuring and 

the National Supervision Commission (8:57)

1. What you missed while waiting for the U.S.-China trade war

source: Xinhuanet

Taking term limits off President Xi wasn't the only big change that came out of China's annual lianghui or 'Two Sessions' - the advisory Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference followed by the rubber-stamp National People's Congress - in March.

'With 'Trump and a looming trade war sucking all the oxygen out of China news in March,' as Andrew Polk of Trivium put it, you may well have overlooked four of the actions coming out of the Two Sessions.

• These four actions massively advance Xi Jinping's efforts to assert the Communist Party’s control over economic and foreign affairs, cultural policies, and the appointment and training of cadres.
• And, are of 'momentous importance for both markets and businesses, especially foreign businesses operating in China,' according to Andrew.

Andrew Polk: 'The four important things that came out of the Two Sessions':

1. Chinese government restructuring. 'We're talking about basically a total overhaul of the government. It's huge. It's momentous. And it's just started.'
2. The policy roadmap. 'The Party and the government are clearer than they've been in many years on exactly what their priorities are.'
3. Personnel. 'Important people were put in important places.'
4. The legislative agenda + the constitutional amendments. 'These are hugely important over the long term for how the economy operates, and how the political system operates, as well.'

What follows is Andrew's analysis of the first action, 'government restructuring,' as well as its most important outcome, the new, super-agency: the National Supervision Commission.

2. Biggest Chinese government restructuring since the 1980s reform era

source: Xinhuanet

'Government restructuring is the most immediate outcome of the two sessions. We're talking about basically a total overhaul of the government,' says Andrew Polk. The biggest restructuring since the Deng Xiaoping reform era of the 1980s.

From Bloomberg:

• The restructuring will 'solidify Communist Party control over key functions of government, further centralizing power.'
• This 'represents China’s most decisive shift yet from 1980s reforms led by Deng Xiaoping aimed at professionalizing the government after Mao Zedong’s disruptive party-led political movements led to famine and bloodshed.'
• 'At the time, Deng had said “the separation of the party and government” was necessary to unleash an economic boom that continues to endure.'
• 'Yet Xi has gone in the opposite direction, arguing that China’s centralized system provides an alternative model for countries to get rich without embracing Western democracy.'

And, from the Wall Street Journal:

• “Xi is telling everyone that not only is the party in charge (it always has been) but also now that the party must be seen as running the government,” said Ryan Manuel, an expert on Chinese politics at the University of Hong Kong.
• “He wants to use more party methods to rule the government, as opposed to the traditional method of having two separate trains running in parallel, with cadres forced to leap back and forth across the tracks.”

Why it matters. 'If you're a markets person, you don't have time to think about Chinese government restructuring, because you're worried about whether global trade is going to collapse in the next month,' says Andrew Polk.

• 'So, I understand why people are focused on the trade war, but this stuff is arguably more important in terms of how China's economy is going to evolve.'

An overview from the Wall Street Journal.  'A look at China’s restructuring of government agencies.'

• 'COMBINED: Separate banking and insurance regulators will be merged into a single agency to better fend off risks in the country’s financial system.'
  
• 'SETUP: A national market regulatory administration with sweeping responsibilities will incorporate functions of a half-dozen offices to oversee business competition and practices, from corporate and antitrust regulation to pricing and food safety.'
  
• 'RETOOLED: A National Health Commission, with responsibilities over public health issues, is replacing the National Health and Family Planning Commission, de-emphasizing government-set birth limits and refocusing policy for an aging society.'
  
• 'REVAMPED: A beefed-up environment ministry will add to its environmental-protection mission, taking on antipollution and conservation functions currently spread across six other agencies.'
  
• 'MERGED: Merging the Culture Ministry with the national tourism administration, in a push to develop and promote Chinese culture, and enhance China’s soft power.'

From the same WSJ article. 'Given the plan’s emphasis on control, foreign businesses—which have complained about unfair and selective regulation—are likely to face more formidable government agencies.'

• 'The newnational market regulatory administration in particular brings under one roof separate bureaus that handled pricing regulation and antimonopoly enforcement, which have in the past pursued high-profile cases against foreign companies.'

Notably absent from the WSJ and other lists in the western media is the new, super-agency: the National Supervisory Commission. Andrew calls this the 'biggest thing' to come out of government restructuring. More on the NSC follows.

3. Biggest big brother: the National Supervisory Commission

source: Xinhuanet

'The biggest thing is the creation of an entirely new branch of government: National Supervisory Commission,' Andrew Polk

Xi Jinping owes much of his public support to his anti-corruption campaign.

• He also owes much of his consolidation of power to the campaign's rooting out some rivals and striking fear into the rest.
• Xi has now streamlined and expanded the reach several notches through the creation of the new, super-agency: the National Supervisory Commission.

'With government restructuring, the biggest thing is the creation of an entirely new branch of government: National Supervisory Commission,' says Andrew Polk

• 'Its entire job is to overlook every single public official in China.'
  
• 'It is an institutionalization and deepening of the corruption crackdown that we've seen over the past few years.'
• 'These trends have been in train for a while - and, were just officially canonized in March.'

The National Supervisory Commission replaces the Party’s Central Commission for Discipline Inspection. 

• The NSC is independent of the State Council, the Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People's Procuratorate (see the chart above).
• And, it reports directly to the China's highest legislative body in China, the National People’s Congress.  

'Some people compare this to the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security after 9/11, but it's way bigger than that.'

• 'It's as if you took the FBI and made it coequal to the executive branch, the legislative branch, and the judicial branch in the U.S.'
• 'The National Supervisory Commission is a brand new branch of government on par with the National People's Congress, the State Council, the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.'

For more on the National Supervisory Commission and its impact, there two short videos below. 

3. The National Supervisory Commission: the stick to ensure that policies are implemented

The National Supervisory Commission is also a stick that helps persuade laggards to implement policy.

• 'The NSC not only institutionalizes the corruption crackdown, but it also makes sure that the discipline inspectors are now more and more involved in policy implementation,' says Andrew

'We've seen this, for example, in the implementation of financial derisking.'

• 'One reason the financial derisking was initially successful in 2017: when the CBRC, and the CIRC, the CSRC, and the PBOC were going out to do their inspections, the discipline inspectors were going with them.'
• 'When the discipline inspectors get involved, lo and behold, things happen quickly.'

That could be good or bad. 'So, we've got two scenarios.

• 'One is potentially having better, more consistent implementation of policy, like we've seen so far in the financial derisking.'
• ''The other is overzealous policy implementation.'
• 'For overall policymaking and implementation, these two outcomes are what you have to watch for.'

'If we get more consistent implementation, that's important for foreign investment.'

• 'Everyone complains that Chinese rules are inconsistently applied from city to city, province to province, day to day, and month to month.'
• 'If we could get more consistency, then that would be a huge improvement in the environment not only for strategic investors like multinational companies.'
• 'And, also for portfolio investors, because then they will know when they can get their money out, in what channels they can get their money out, what legal avenues they have to make complaints, and what asset classes they can legally invest in. If you've got consistency in those rules, it would be a huge improvement in the market environment.'

The flipside is over-zealous implementation.

• 'As we all know, the history of China has been that the center makes policy, but it never gets implemented very well locally.'
• 'Now the pendulum's swinging all the way to the other side, where policy is sometimes being implemented too zealously.'

'We've seen this in a number of cases,' says Andrew. 'One example is in the push to switch from coal to gas heat.'

• 'The Central Government said, "You've got to stop using X amount of coal, and start using X amount of gas."'
• 'It set targets for the northeast of China.'
• 'The discipline inspectors were out making sure that local governments were hitting it.'
• 'So, the local leadership in Dongbei, in the northeast part of China, said, "We're going to hit these targets no matter what."'
• 'They ended up shutting down businesses because there wasn't enough gas supply to offset the reduction in coal.'
• 'And, homes were left out in the cold.' 

'After many such cases, the Central Government has moved to mitigate the problem.'

• 'For example, the latest environmental regulations clearly state, "Cadres need to carry these out in a way that isn't disruptive to business and people's lives,"
• 'This is a pretty straightforward acknowledgement that last time they implemented these rules, it was chaotic, and done in a blind fashion.'

'Given all this, it's hard to predict where the next case of over-zealousness may come from, but I think it's going to play out case-by-case.'

• 'As investors or people doing business in China, you need to be on the lookout for exactly the pace and rationale of policy implementation.'
• 'And, after a policy is put forth, you need to track the people implementing it to see if they are going overboard.'
• 'If they are, you need to watch out for the unintended consequences.'

Andrew was formerly director of China research at Medley Global Advisors and senior China economist at The Conference Board China Center for Economics and Business in Beijing.

Previously, he worked at the Institute of International Finance, where he conducted macroeconomic analysis on emerging markets in the Asia/Pacific region. His research focus has included monetary policy, capital flows, and financial market development throughout East and Southeast Asia, with a particular emphasis on China. He has also conducted growth and inflation forecasting and country risk analysis for the region.

He has held research positions at the East Asia Desk of the U.S. Treasury Department, the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, and Foreign Policy magazine.

Andrew earned his BA in American studies and communication at Texas A&M University and holds an MA with distinction in economics and China studies from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.

Thank you for reading!

Please send me your thoughts at malcolm.riddell@riddell-tseng.com

Until next time,

Malcolm 

More on the National Supervisory Commission

Inside China’s new anti-corruption “super body”

CGTN (1:47)

Yukon Huang on potential anti-corruption changes in China
Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment, and

CHINADebate contributor (4:20)

Behind the U.S.-China trade dispute:

'The West's China gamble has failed.'

ByMalcolm Riddell· April 19, 2018

Greetings and welcome back!

What's the root cause of the current friction between the U.S. and China?  The West's disappointment that China did follow the western model but its own, argues Ed Tse, CEO of Gao Feng Advisory Company (a member of the China Analyst Network).

Ed's solution: look to the similarities between China and the West, especially in the tech sector, and be alert to China's evolution toward better IPR,  market access, and other contentious issues, not just the remaining shortcomings.

Below is a video of my discussion with Ed and excerpts from both the interview and his South China Morning Post op-ed, 'Chinese innovation with US characteristics? Maybe China and the West aren’t that far apart, in business at least.'

Ed presents insights that differ greatly from the China Echo Chamber in the U.S. Let me know what you think.

All the best,

Malcolm

Please invite your friends and colleagues to join the conversation.

Tell me anything on your mind about China, including what you think about what you are reading here.

Just reply to this email, or reach me at malcolm.riddell@riddell-tseng.com

Watch Ed Tse's interview (8:57}

1. Behind the U.S.-China trade dispute:

'The West's China gamble has failed.'

'China has not gone the way the West anticipated.
Instead, China has developed its own system.'

 'The looming trade war between the U.S. and China is front-page news around the world,' writes Ed Tse, founder and CEO of Gao Feng Advisory Company, known also as the "father of management consulting in China," in the South China Morning Post on March 29.

• 'On the surface, it looks like U.S. President Donald Trump following up on his campaign rhetoric of “America first” and part of his strategy to treat China as a “strategic competitor."'
• 'However, it’s possible to trace the roots of the current impasse to a fundamental mistrust between the West, in particular the U.S., and China.'
• 'The cover story on the March 3, 2018 issue of The Economist, “How the West Got China Wrong”, epitomises that point of view.'

Here's whatThe Economist had to say: 

• 'After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the West welcomed the next big communist country into the global economic order.'
• 'Western leaders believed that giving China a stake in institutions such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO) would bind it into the rules-based system set up after the second world war.'
• 'They hoped that economic integration would encourage China to evolve into a market economy and that, as they grew wealthier, its people would come to yearn for democratic freedoms, rights and the rule of law.'
• 'The gamble has failed.'

Ed Tse: 'China has not gone the way the West anticipated.'

• 'Instead, China has developed its own system. Many people call it the "China development model." And, China has found a way that works.'
• 'It's a bit unreasonable for people in the West to expect there's only one way to run a country - our way - and that every country will need to follow that way.'
• Especially, '...given the major disruptive events over the past decade, such as the 2008 financial crisis, the election of Donald Trump as U.S. president, and sluggish economic growth for well over a decade.'

• Instead, 'China continues to be a one-party state while embracing some aspects of the Western-defined market economy and maintaining a strong government role.' 

• Using the China development model, 'Beijing was able to lift China from basic subsistence to a situation where many people now enjoy a reasonable livelihood.' 
• 'Ideology apart, it is difficult to argue that there is only one way to govern, no matter what the context of the country.' 

2. 'Chinese entrepreneurs look to the U.S. for inspiration'

source: South China Morning Post

'The spirit of entrepreneurship in China has not been that different from the spirit of entrepreneurship in the U.S.' Ed Tse

'The real point - the most important point - I made in the South China Morning Post op-ed is that politics aside, or ideology aside, actually there's a lot of similarities between the U.S. and China in terms of business, in particular in terms of entrepreneurship,' Ed Tse told me.

'Entrepreneurship returned to China 40 years ago with the reforms started by Deng Xiaoping.'

'Since then, in fact, the whole format and the spirit of entrepreneurship in China has not been that different from the whole form and the spirit of entrepreneurship in the U.S.'

'Chinese entrepreneurs, particular those in the tech sector, have looked towards the U.S. for inspiration since their beginning.'

• 'I'm talking about the internet companies now, Alibaba, TenCent, Baidu, and many others.'
• 'When they try to set up the business, when they think about the strategy, when they think about the organization, when they think about the business model, they look to the U.S. - Silicon Valley, the Northwest, the Greater Boston area, and other U.S. tech centers.'

'The mindset, mentality and approach of both the U.S. and Chinese tech companies, as well as their investors, are very similar and many mutual benefits have been built over the years.'

• 'So, while politically, perhaps, the West may be disappointed that China has not gone its way, from the business standpoint, China and the West – especially innovative centres in the U.S. – have much in common and have adopted very similar philosophies.'
• 'In fact, the Chinese and the U.S. tech ecosystems are already quite intertwined, and it would be hard to separate the two.'

3. In IPR, market access, and force tech transfer, China is moving in the right direction

source: Wall Street Journal

'With or without a trade war, the Chinese are already moving at least in the right direction,' says Ed Tse.

'The Chinese are actually exercising more stringent protection on the intellectual property rights, not only with respect to the foreigners, but also for the Chinese themselves.'

• 'It's critical.The Chinese government would like to advance China into a more technologically advanced country. To achieve this, the protection of intellectual property rights has got to be better. The Chinese are not dumb. They're trying to do that.'
• 'At the same time, it requires some time. The Chinese government is trying to move things in the right direction with the right kind of speed.'

'Also with market access. To just blanketly say the Chinese government has closed the market for foreign participation, including American companies to participate in China market is totally bullshit.'

• 'There are many sectors in China that are already very open or entirely open for U.S. companies' participation.'
• 'There are some sectors that are not entirely open, but the direction again is in the right direction.'
• 'The Chinese government continues to gradually open up industry sectors for foreign participation, and the Chinese government is very committed in doing that.'

'To say, "Well, the Chinese government really forced foreign companies to transfer proprietary technology," again is not always right.'

• 'There are some situations that actually have been enforced, has been asked for, and of course that's not appropriate.'
• 'Premier Li has already come out and said that the Chinese government will try not to require or force foreign companies to transfer proprietary technology through this kind of requirement. Let's see how it goes, but I think Premier Li was sincere.'
• 'By the way, the forced tranfers are not of proprietary technology. Many of these are secondhand or thirdhand technology.'
• 'The core of technology transferred in the auto industry, for example, is ancient technology.'
• 'In fact, the foreign companies have really not come forth in any big way to transfer that cutting-edge technology.'
• [Editor's note: That is also my direct experience in negotiating JVs on behalf of Western clients - the Chinese side demanded the latest technology; I argued - and won - that the Western side would only give older versions.]

'If you look at the direction the China government is taking China, some of these issues are non-issues or quickly becoming non-issues.'

• 'It's critical for foreign companies, in particular American companies, to really recognize these directions and be willing to participate in the evolution of the China market to capture the  potential that the China market offers them.'

4. 'Focusing on differences will not help us.'

'The Chinese saying “qiu tong cun yi” (求同存异) means “seeking similarities while allowing for differences,"' says Ed Tse.

• 'The West, and the US in particular, should view China in this light.'
• 'China is on the verge of a sustained, generational rise, and President Xi Jinping has made it clear China would like to play a role in global leadership and governance.'
• 'By focusing more on the similarities, both global commerce and business will benefit.'

'I would encourage U.S. politicians and U.S. pundits to really look more at the similarities rather than the differences

• 'Focusing on differences will not help us.'
• 'Focusing on similarities will.'

Ed is founder & CEO of Gao Feng Advisory Company, a global strategy and management consulting firm with roots in China, as well the leading expert on Chinese innovation. And, a member of CHINADebate's China Analyst Network.

He formerly led the China operations of the Boston Consulting Group and Booz Allen Hamilton/Booz & Company, respectively, for a period of 20 years.

Ed is also the author of over 150 articles and four books including the award-winning The China Strategy (2010) and China’s Disruptors: 

How Alibaba, Xiaomi, Tencent, and Other Companies are Changing the Rules of Business (2015).

Thank you for reading!

Please send me your thoughts at malcolm.riddell@riddell-tseng.com

Be sure to check out Ed Tse's: China's Disruptors: How Alibaba, Xiaomi, Tencent, and Other Companies are Changing the Rules of Business'

Until next time,

Malcolm 

'We Brexited Asia!'

TPP is signed without U.S.

ByMalcolm Riddell· March 15, 2018

Greetings and welcome back!

Bob Savage, CEO of TRACK and member of CHINADebate's China Analyst Network, brings a warning: expected - and reasonable - volatility has collapsed. But, there is a lot more uncertainty than the markets show. 

Where this is important for China is the dollar. A weak dollar gives China room to maneuver; a strong dollar, not so much.

So, if China is buying the current market sentiment that the dollar is going to weaken, rather acknowledging the uncertainty, then it could make bad decisions that impact not just China but world markets.

All this might be a little too in the weeds for some of us, but to fully understand the China situation, critical.

In case you missed it, Tom Friedman did a great op-ed in the New York Times. That's where we begin. 

And, as always, let me know what you're thinking.

All the best,

Malcolm

Please invite your friends and colleagues to join the conversation.

Tell me anything on your mind about China, including what you think about what you are reading here.

Just reply to this email, or reach me at malcolm.riddell@riddell-tseng.com

1. 'We Brexited Asia!' -TPP signed without the U.S.

'China has not only taken our lunch,

they’ve opened a restaurant that’s serving it to their citizens.'

Trump is right. In an NYT op-ed today, Thomas Friedman quotes David Autor, an MIT economist:

• 'China’s rapid rise, while enormously positive for world welfare, has created identifiable losers in trade-impacted industries and the labor markets in which they are located.'
• Friedman writes: 'Autor and his colleagues David Dorn and Gordon Hanson found in a 2016 study that roughly 40 percent of the decline in U.S. manufacturing between 2000 and 2007 was due to a surge in imports from China primarily after it joined the W.T.O.
• 'And it led to the sudden loss of about one million factory jobs in Ohio, Michigan, Wisconsin and Pennsylvania. Trump won all of those states.' Can't blame 'em.

'We Brexited Asia' says Friedman about President Trump's pulling out of the TPP.

• Even so, last week trade ministers from 11 countries - including Japan and Australia, but not China (which is promoting its own trade deal) or the U.S. - signed the Trans Pacific Partnership.
• Friedman writes: 'Alas, Trump tore it up without reading it — one of the stupidest foreign policy acts ever. We Brexited Asia! China was not in TPP. It was a coalition built, in part, to pressure Beijing into fairer market access, by our rules. Trump just gave it up for free.'

'So what would a smart American president do?' Friedman asks.

• 'First, he’d sign the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade accord.
• 'Once a smart president restored participation in TPP, he’d start secret trade talks with the Chinese — no need for anyone to lose face — and tell Beijing: “Since you like your trade rules so much, we’re going to copy them for your companies operating in America: 25 percent tariffs on your cars, and your tech companies that open here have to joint venture and share intellectual property with a U.S. partner — and store all their data on U.S. servers.”'

Friedman's second recommendation is already in the works .

• 'U.S. President Donald Trump is seeking to impose tariffs on up to $60 billion of Chinese imports and will target the technology and telecommunications sectors,' reports Reuters today.' So much for secret talks.

President Trump will impose these tariffs under 'Section 301.'

For all you need to know about 'Section 301' (and how it differs from the Section 232 steel and aluminum tariffs), 

• Read and watch 'Trump's tariffs just first shot—the big China action is Section 301'
• Great analysis by Leland Miller, president of China Beige Book and member of CHINADebate's China Analyst Network.

Best quote: 'China has not only taken our lunch, they’ve opened a restaurant that’s serving it to their citizens,' says David Autor, MIT economist, in Friedman's op-ed.

BTW: If you're wondering why Winnie the Pooh, in the gif above, is preparing to chow down on the U.S. lunch, read why 'China Censors Winnie-the-Pooh on Social Media.'  Here's a hint.

2. 'Market volatility is like cockroaches.'

Where's the volatility?

Collapse in Volatility. Market makers must have steel nerves. With all that's happened, you would think that markets would be racked with volatility.

• And yet, as Bob Savage, CEO of TRACK, says 'the most surprising story is the collapse in volatility across all sorts of asset classes.'

• Instead of the expected volatility, 'equities are 3% away from their all-time highs, hit in January; the NASDAQ is at an all-time high; and, currency markets have quieted down completely, even though we have these new and coming trade tariffs and the threat of a trade war.'

'The market expectation for the next three months is actually for a very modest amount of volatility.'

• 'But, I think the market might be wrong about all of this, and that the expectations that we're going to be in for a great spring, where equities, and bonds, and foreign exchange have very quiet and confident markets, is probably also wrong.'

3. 'A weaker dollar puts China in a very strong position' - but is going to weaken?

'If a guy like me, who has watched these things for the last 30 years, is ambivalent about the next 3 or 4% in the dollar, and has good arguments on either side, it's a little scary.'

 'A weaker dollar puts China in a very strong position, because a weaker dollar gives them flexibility to not do very much different, and not have to respond to a squeeze of dollars, which is what their biggest risk is over the next year,' says Bob Savage, CEO of Track.

'Right now, the market story is that the dollar will slowly weaken 1 or 2 percent.'

• 'But, there is really a lot more confusion and uncertainty about volatility in forex markets than the markets are taking into account.'
• 'The momentum and chop of the market is also very unclear. You look at these technical charts, like the one below. They don't inspire me with a lot of confidence. You look at the fundamentals. They don't inspire me with a lot of confidence.'
• 'The path of the dollar over the next three months could easily be 3% higher or 3% lower, and there are good arguments on both sides, and yet the market is pricing in a very quiet 1 or 2% moving market, which I think is wrong.'

'If a guy like me, who has watched these things for the last 30 years, is ambivalent about the next 3 or 4% in the dollar, and has good arguments on either side, it's a little scary.'

'For China, the big question: Are officials buying the story that the dollar will slowly weaken 1 or 2 percent, or are they as uncertain as I am?'

• 'I can only hope that they are making cautious decisions based uncertainty. Because if they feel pretty confident that the dollar will weaken, and they're wrong. Well, it's not just bad for China, but for world markets.'

4. Trump's next move on China: Section 301?

 'The next big hurdle for markets is going to be whether Section 301 action on China is going to follow these steel and aluminum tariffs, and what China's reaction to that is.'

'The recent trade data from China was compelling for the Trump side to take action. The U.S. trade deficit to China is bigger than ever.

• 'China had a surprisingly large amount of exports, and a troubling small amount of imports.'
• 'Average them together over January and February, because of the lunar new year, it's still troubling.'
• 'It shows that while China is hopefully on a demand-based focused effort, exports still underpin a lot of their industry.'

'This isn't the way that the world wants to see China develop. What you really want to see is China for China's sake.'

• 'China importing goods and exporting them at a higher end is probably what the authorities want, but the guys on the ground might not be listening to the authorities as clearly.'
• 'The issue for a huge trade surplus in China puts them back into current account surplus territory, and how they're going to use that money.'

5. OBOR countries now have big trade deficit with China

The One Belt, One Road or Belt Road Initiative countries 'didn't see a lot of love from the rest of the world in the post-Soviet era,' says Bob Savage of TRACK.

• 'By putting in infrastructure and giving them loans, China has changed the picture.'

Buy Chinese. 'China's recent trade data showed an almost 25% rise in trade with OBOR countries in China's favor- that's probably now accelerating.'

• 'As a result, the OBOR countries now have a pretty substantial trade deficit to China.'

Thank you for reading!

Please send me your thoughts at malcolm.riddell@riddell-tseng.com

And, email me if you would like to learn more about the China Analyst Network - it's launching soon!

Be sure to check out Bob Savage's Morning Track!

Until next time,

Malcolm 

How Trump's tariffs impact China's trade/currency relations with Japan & Korea

China markets update with TRACK's Bob Savage

ByMalcolm Riddell· March 9, 2018

Greetings and welcome back!

Peter Navarro, along with Wilbur Ross, won the tariff debate. Dr. Navarro, a few years ago, wrote Death by China, where he lays out his arguments why the U.S. must confront China on trade, currency, business, and the rest.

And, to drive the point home, he also made a one hour and 20 minute long movie. The few seconds from the film, below, will give you the flavor of Dr. Navarro's thinking.

But, with the steel and aluminum tariffs, he seems to have missed his target. China doesn't export a lot of steel to the U.S., although by shipping through third countries, it does supply more than the official numbers indicate. You just can't trust Chinese data.

Whether you agree with the proposed tariffs or not, the tariffs have gotten the attention of the markets. Yet, one that hasn't received a lot of press is the currency market.

So, I invited experienced forex trader and markets expert Bob Savage, CEO of TRACK,  to explain how the tariffs are affecting the currency market generally and China and Asia more specifically. 

Read his comments and watch the short video, then let me know what of Bob's analysis.

All the best,

Malcolm

Please invite your friends and colleagues to join the conversation.

Tell me anything on your mind about China, including what you think about what you are reading here.

Just reply to this email, or reach me at malcolm.riddell@riddell-tseng.com

1. The 'Trump Risk Premium'

The Trump brand means 'premium'

Bob Savage, CEO of TRACK, explains: 'The currency markets are embroiled in trying to figure out whether the Trump tariffs on steel and aluminum are good or bad for the U.S. economy and the U.S. stock market.'

'Just like other markets, in the foreign exchange context, the dollar already has a "Trump risk premium" built into it.'

• 'In forex terms, the "Trump risk premium" is measured by how much higher our real rate is than the rest of the world's.'
• 'The G7 real rate in Europe is negative, the G7 real rate for Japan is negative, but for the U.S., it's positive.'
• 'That indicates to me that no one has faith that we are going to pay our bills or that this president means what he says.'

'How much the U.S. president is supported abroad is a measure that we all want to try to correlate to how it affects markets.'

• 'The U.S. is a special case because we need about $400 to $500 billion of foreign money to fund ourselves.'
• 'Otherwise we have to do it internally, and that requires a shift in our savings mechanisms -  we would have to force Americans to buy their own bonds.'
• 'Instead, we force other countries to buy our bonds.'

'The petrodollar argument of the 1970s is a classic example, where the difference between Trump and Reagan may well be in that recycling of U.S. dollars abroad.'

• 'Because we have big trade deficits, the money has always traditionally gone back to the United States in funding our budget deficits.'
• 'This is not the case when you have a negative view of U.S. growth and a negative view of how the world is going to react to U.S. deficits.'

2. Trump's tariffs: a coup China soft power

Probably not really real cuddly

Bob Savage, CEO of TRACK, believes 'China's going to try to do a couple of things with the U.S. tariffs.'

'One is defensive - making sure that this doesn't hurt them competitively.'

• 'China doesn't officially import a lot of steel and aluminum to the U.S.,  But, its trading partners Korea and Japan do.'
• 'So, Korea and Japan could be tempted to make a traditional reaction to tariffs - devalue the currency. And, China will use its reserves to buy Yen and Won to head that off.'
• 'I note, though, that Korea and Japan's steel and aluminum exports to the U.S. aren't really big enough to justify devaluation, but the issue still needs examination. More later.'

'Two is public relations - using the tariffs to try to win the mantle of the good player in Asia and the international arena, to show that they're not retaliatory and reactive to U.S. noise, but instead very thoughtful, and plodding, and fair in their way. All to the U.S.'s disadvantage.'

• 'In Asia, China has already been working to position itself as the 'good player,' as, for example, becoming, the go-to provider for capital in emerging markets, expanding the One Belt One Road and their new infrastructure plans there, and so on.'

'All this certainly is putting Asia in a tight spot.'

• 'They don't feel that the U.S. is offering them anything.'
• 'They don't feel like China is perhaps the right player to go to, but it might be the only choice.'
• 'If I'm reading Beijing correctly, the leadership in China would like to offer Asia and the world an alternative to U.S. hegemony to Trump's madness. And, the tariffs play right into China's hand.'

3. The RMB-Yen & RMB-Won relationship...it's complicated

Bob Savage, CEO of TRACK, says: 'When it comes to Asia, these tariffs are really difficult to put your head around, because they affect Korea, they affect Japan, and their trade relations with China are incredibly important.'

• 'Therefore, I'm looking at how the Renminbi-Yen and Renminbi-Won relationships trade.'
• 'Especially, how China manages the Won and Yen to the Renminbi, and whether this is its preparation for a harsher game ahead.'

  
  

'If you look at the chart of Won and Yen, below, they've broken out.' 

• 'The Yen is considerably stronger. If you were just trading this on a technical basis, if you were going, "I want to be long Yen and short Renminbi."'
• 'Korea is not quite the same game, but it certainly is no longer a game where Korea gets a free pass because of North Korean worries or a new government.'

'Both of those countries need to see that they can't competitively devalue to gain any market share at all.' 

'In this case, Japan and Korea wouldn't want to devalue anyway because steel isn't a huge part of their export path. It's really about autos.'

'But, it makes a point here about the traditional way of dealing with tariffs, and this is the key point: what do tariffs really mean? How do you deal with a tariff, if you're a country? There's two ways.'

• 'One is you substitute a product.'

'Or, two, you devalue your currency to make up for the tariff.

• 'Here's what I mean. I'm in Japan, and I get slapped with a 25% steel tariff, and my steel happens to be (but, in fact, is not) what is in demand for high-end products, and the United States is using it.'
• 'Well, then you're going to try to devalue the currency to give your companies a competitive advantage to make up for the disadvantage of the tariff.'
• 'But, now it looks like that game isn't going to work.'

'The reason why devaluations probably don't work for emerging markets or the G7 currencies this time around is that China is going to be able to use its reserves to buy those currencies and prevent them from weakening too quickly.'

• 'We've seen China this year actively buying Korean Won and Japanese Yen along with the euro. This was originally taken as a sign of China's displeasure with holding U.S. assets'
• 'But, it is also a larger game of trying to live in a world where China is trying to manage its currency and how it trades against a 24 other currencies.'

'In this case, Japan and Korea are being told by China, "You're no longer going to be given a free ride to devalue when you have an economic hiccup," because it has an immediate impact upon China.'

Watch Bob Savage's full China markets update here (11:25)

'E-commerce' is rapidly

evolving into 'New Retail.'

Jack Ma, Alibaba

ByMalcolm Riddell· March 6, 2018

Greetings!

I am not a sci-fi fan, but I did see Minority Report in 2002.

I don't remember anything about the movie, except the scene where Tom Cruise is walking down a shopping mall hallway  and ads pop up, one after another, each tailored to Tom's preferences. 

Fast forward 15 years (just 15 years) and Alibaba's New Retail is getting us closer to that experience.

Ed Tse, founder of the Gao Feng consultancy and the leading expert on Chinese innovation, introduced me to New Retail in a recent conversation.

You will find his explanation of New Retail below, along with a couple of videos showing New Retail in action - as amazing today as Minority Report seemed years ago. 

Perhaps even more amazing is the China business strategy, the 'Third Way,' that made things like New Retail possible.

Ed explains the Third Way in Part Two of our discussion that I will be posting soon. Chinese do do things their own way, as the Third Way again demonstrates.

For now, have a look at the future today. And, stay tuned for Part Two for Ed's explanation of the Third Way that made New Retail possible.

All the best,

Malcolm

Please invite your friends and colleagues to join the conversation.

Tell me anything on your mind about China, including what you think about what you are reading here.

Just reply to this email, or reach me atmalcolm.riddell@riddell-tseng.com.

1. 'E-commerce' is rapidly evolving into 'New Retail.' Jack Ma, Alibaba

'Ed Tse, founder of the Gao Feng consultancy, says, 'Recently, Alibaba has gotten significantly into New Retail. In his October 2016 letter to Alibaba shareholders, Jack Ma wrote':

• 'Commerce as we know it is changing in front of our eyes.'
• 'E-commerce' is rapidly evolving into 'New Retail.'
  
• 'The boundary between offline and online commerce disappears as we focus on fulfilling the personalized needs of each customer.'

Ed explains, 'New Retail combines of online retail and offline retail.'

• 'This is also known in China as "O.M.O." or "Online Merging with Offline" - merging through technology - sensor technology, online payment, artificial intelligence, and so on - to make the customer experience very much hassle-free.'
• 'This is an entirely new ecosystem for retail.'
• 'And, besides its own stores, Alibaba is now working with a large number of offline retailers so that they can build their own New Retail ecosystems.'

Amzaon led the way. 'China needs a pioneer. What the Chinese are very good at is picking up a concept and applying it in China in a much more intensive and much faster manner.'

• 'In this case, the pioneer was Amazon Go, and the outcome is Alibaba's New Retail.'

'With Alibaba, ecommerce is still the core. But, through ecommerce, it also built the basic infrastructure and the basic capabilities relying on big data. On connectivity. On its ability to create an ubiquitous user space.'

• 'Alibaba's Taobao, the online commerce platform, for example, has something like 500 million daily active users. Ubiquitous database, user space.' 
• 'To do something like New Retail, you have to have that kind of ubiquitous user space. You have to know each of the users, individually.'
• 'Alibaba will know you, "Malcolm Riddell," individually. Even though it has an ubiquitous database with information about hundreds of millions of users on that database, Alibaba knows you individually.'
  
• 'And, using that information Alibaba can personalize your New Retail shopping experience.'

Ed describes how the Alibaba's New Retail might work as an ecosystem.

• 'You register on the app, or if are a user of Alibaba's Taobao you don't need to register.'
• 'If you a user of Taobao, Alibaba already knows your preferences, what kind of products that you like.'
• 'When you go to a store, you are identified right away through facial recognition or body recognition.'
• 'You go in and robots will automatically take you to where your favorite products are. You go to your aisle, you look at a product. You may make some choices. You scan the QR code.'
• 'The app will know or automatically what kind of product you want to buy or don't want to buy.'
• 'Then, you press a button, check out, and just walk out.'
• 'The merchandise will be delivered by smart logistics to your home within "X" number of hours.'

2. New Retail, a 'third way' ecosystem among ecosytems

 New Retail is one of a multitude of ecosystems that are part of China's 'Third Way' of doing strategy.

• In Part Two of our conversation, Ed Tse, founder of the Gao Feng consultancy will explain more about the Third Way.
• For now, here's a brief explanation. 

Ed notes, 'Lots of people ask me, "It seems that all of a sudden there are so many Chinese companies that have become so big, so valuable, so quickly. How did they do it?" I answer...'

• 'The very best Chinese companies, or the fastest growing Chinese companies are those who adopt the "third way" of thinking about strategy.'
  
• 'Using "third way" strategy, they make multiple jumps from business to another business to another business, and so on - as the chart below shows.'

'In the process, they fill in the gaps in capability through creating ecosystems - a network of collaborators - who can help them.'

• 'You put all of a company's ecosystems together, and they become one mega-ecosystem.'
• 'That mega-ecosystem is the major contributor to the high valuation of these kind of companies.'

3. Watch New Retail in action

Alibaba has a website, Alizila: News from Alibaba.

Here are two pretty amazing short videos from the site that show the New Retail experience for customers.

Have a look.

'Take a Tour of a Hema Supermarket and

Experience "New Retail"'

(3:03 mins)

'Trump's tariffs just first shot - the big China action is Section 301' [Section 301, huh?]

ByMalcolm Riddell· March 1, 2018

Greetings!

As soon as I read the headline, 'Trump announces steel and aluminum tariffs over objections from advisors and Republicans,' I called Leland Miller, president of China Beige Book. 

Leland points out that President Trump's really big trade move against China yet to come, that is, Section 301 penalties. If you aren't up to speed on 301, you will be after you read and watch Leland's comments.

As Leland says, with Section 301, 'regardless of how Section 232 steel and aluminum tariffs end up in the next few days - you're seeing the beginning, not the end, of Trump's aggressiveness on trade.' 

'And, I don't think people have prepared themselves yet for the fact that 301 is coming.'

Let me know what you think.

All the best,

Malcolm

Please invite your friends and colleagues to join the conversation.

Tell me anything on your mind about China, including what you think about what you are reading here.

Just reply to this email, or reach me at malcolm.riddell@riddell-tseng.com.

1. 'Today's tariffs just Trump's first shot - the real China action is Section 301' [Section 301, huh?]

[Note: If you're not up on the difference - and it's a vitally important difference - Section 232 and Section 301, please go to part 2, below.]

Leland Miller, CEO of China Beige Book told me: 'Donald Trump just announced several minutes ago that he was indeed going forward with Section 232 tariffs on steel and aluminum. Here's my take and some context.'

'When the Trump administration was originally developing the strategy for responding to China trade problems, they evaluated two major lines of attacks using tariffs.'

• 'One line of attack was Section 232 - that's what you're hearing about today.'
• 'Today's 232 move is just for steel and aluminum tariffs, it's not China specific, and it's something that relies on the ability of the White House to be able to say, "National security dictates that we regulate these imports with particular tariffs."'

• 'The big problem with that as a China move: China is not a major exporter steel or aluminum to the U.S. So, this is not really something that's going to hit China particularly hard directly.'

• 'Indirectly, this will hit China. China has been sending its steel through third-party countries in Southeast Asia and elsewhere so that it comes into the U.S. not identified as Chinese. Today's action is partly designed to stop this.'

'But, because these are tariffs on global imports, this is going to upset a lot of America's strongest allies.'

• 'You're already having foreign delegations rush to the White House right now to lobby to get them out, carve them out.'
• 'Trump hasn't signed anything yet. So, you could see carve outs for allies in the final document.' 

'What the President might do after making such a splash today brings us to the other line of attack: Section 301.'

• 'Section 301 has always been the White House's underlying platform - its center- for the anti-China assault on the trade side.'
• Why? 'Unlike Section 232, Section 301 targets unfair trade practices, not products; and it targets a specific country, not the whole world.'
• 'So, with 301, the President has the power to basically do whatever he wants to China on the tariff side in order to deal with the fact that the Chinese have been stealing intellectual property and a 301 investigation has found them guilty of that.'

'In response, he has the option to either have a very mild action or something that would be much larger than what he announced today with Section 232 tariffs on steel and aluminum, much more severe.'

• 'If he went for something severe, such as broad sectoral tariffs - tried to take down, say, China consumer electronics - then, you would have justifiable reason to call this a trade war.'

'With today's 232 tariffs on steel and aluminum, there was actually strong opposition across the government, across the administration. Even within the White House where, except for a handful of people, advisors were very, very against this - they think Trump's opening up Pandora's box.'

• 'So, it's interesting that there's not much opposition to the country-specific Section 301.'
• '301 is likely to go forward as planned. We just don't know how big yet.'

'How big 301 actions will be depends on how this 232 tariffs saga ends up'.

• 'As I mentioned, if 232 goes forward in anywhere close to the current way it's being described by the President, it is absolutely against the wishes and inclinations of almost everyone, within most of the industries, even within the Trump White House.'

• 'Republicans in Congress don't want it, either. So there's a lot of politics to this.'

• 'The President's backed himself into a little bit of a corner - I think you're most likely going to see 232 going forward, but the chances are that it gets pulled back some.'

• 'All this is something that's going to have to be sorted through before the President decides whether these 232 tariffs are enough, whether he has to pull 232 back a bit, or whether he wants to go even bigger with 301.'

'The President's impulse seems to be to go bigger. And 3o1 - it's faster, it's louder, it's bigger, than other routes, such as going through WTO processes.'

• 'Section 301 essentially allows the President to right the wrongs that he believes have not been dealt with by the WTO.'
• 'Wrongs that in his mind and in the minds of Wilbur Ross and Peter Navarro and Bob Lighthizer that the Chinese have been committing for years, for decades now.'
• 'Where WTO has not done anything about them, and other Presidents have not done anything about them, he will.
• 'And, quite frankly, what the President wants here is a big splash - if he uses 301, he can show that his campaign rhetoric about being a strong warrior on trade is credible.'

'For these reasons, I believe that you're seeing right now - regardless of how 232 ends up in the next few days - you're seeing the beginning, not the end, of Trump's aggressiveness on trade.' 

'And, I don't think people have prepared themselves yet for the fact that 301 is coming.'

VIDEO | Leland Miller on why today's tariff are just Trump's first shot - and why the real China action to come is Section 301 (7 mins)

2. Section 232 & Section 301: The Difference

 Leland Miller explains the difference between Section 232 (Trade Expansion Act of 1962) and Section 301 (Trade Act of 1974).

'Broadly speaking, these are two very different measures.'

• 'Section 232, is product specific and focuses on whether imports of that product threaten U.S. national security. The President can take any actions to “adjust the imports of an article and its derivatives” or other non-trade related actions he thinks are necessary to protect national security.'
• 'Section 301 is country specific and allows the U.S. to impose trade sanctions on foreign countries that either violate trade agreements or engage in other unfair trade practices.'

'The Section 232 tariffs the President has announced today are specifically for steel and aluminum.'

• 'Steel and aluminum are each the subject of an active 232 investigation and their imports have been deemed threats to national security.'
• 'Because of these findings, the President has declared their import  threats to national security, and that's why he's taking action on them.'

• 'When he signs the tariff orders, the effect is global. That means, the President is putting steel and aluminum tariffs on imports from everywhere around the world, but he can carve out certain countries to be exempt.'

'Section 301 is very different -  it's country specific, not product specific.'

• 'Section 301 has to do with unfair trade practices - in this case, it is intellectual property theft, and it is a China-specific investigation that nailed China.'

'The idea behind how to push an aggressive trade front against China has always been centered around 301.'

• 'That's the way you really get at China, not through 232, which is global, but through 301, which allows China-specific application.'

VIDEO | Leland Miller on the difference

between Section 232 and Section 301 (1 min)

Leland Miller is president of China Beige Book. A leading authority on China’s economy and financial system - “One of Wall Street’s brightest China minds” (Business Insider) - Leland is a frequent contributor about China, both on-air and in print, to virtually every major media outlet.

His firm, China Beige Book operates the largest private in-country China data-collection network to gather real-time economic data from thousands of firms across all of China.

China Beige Bookuses this data to provide independent data and in-depth analysis on every key component of China’s diverse economy to help decision-makers invest intelligently into one of the world’s least transparent economies.

And, China Beige Bookis a member of CHINADebate's China Analyst Network.

The top independent - and ever smiling - China analysts come together at the

China Analyst Network