‘Perhaps the most problematic aspect of the 'Longer Telegram's' emphasis on Xi—“All U.S. political and policy responses to China therefore should be focused through the principal lens of Xi himself”—is the author’s conclusion that Washington should be seeking to escape from, and even try to effect the removal of, Xi’s leadership because that could restore U.S.-China relations to a potentially constructive path: “its pre-2013 path—i.e., the pre-Xi strategic status quo.” ’

• ‘Washington should do this by directing its strategy “at the internal fault lines of domestic Chinese politics” because “the party is extremely divided on Xi’s leadership,” and particularly on his foreign policy assertiveness: “Xi’s critics contend that [his] ‘forcing of the pace’ has resulted in Beijing taking unnecessary risks by bringing about a fundamental change in U.S. strategy toward China much earlier than was either necessary or desirable.” ’

‘One of the author’s central premises is that “if leadership change were to occur, it would be more likely to move in the direction of a more moderate collective leadership” that would be easier for Washington to work with, and presumably less assertive and confrontational toward the United States.’

• ‘ “If leadership change does not occur, then the objective is to maximize internal political pressures on Xi to moderate Chinese policy of his own volition or to roll back various of his international initiatives.” ’

‘This is a profoundly misguided if not dangerous approach.’