!['The Sources of Soviet Conduct'](https://cdn.prod.website-files.com/5a3e922cf6b9a40001bc2d70/60be827db389d2106ecacf3a_TG04KzB-_PhFwbwGt2GRRjl72eJkfbmt4t8yenImKBWpnB4YU4myT9-8UqDpoJyK.png)
'The main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.’
‘The political personality of Soviet power as we know it today is the product of ideology and circumstances:’
- ‘ideology inherited by the present Soviet leaders from the movement in which they had their political origin, and’
- ‘circumstances of the power which they now have exercised for nearly three decades in Russia.’
‘There can be few tasks of psychological analysis more difficult than to try to trace the interaction of these two forces and the relative role of each in the determination of official Soviet conduct.’
- ‘Yet the attempt must be made if that conduct is to be understood and effectively countered.’
II
‘Of the original ideology, nothing has been officially junked.’
- ‘Belief is maintained in the basic badness of capitalism, in the inevitability of its destruction, in the obligation of the proletariat to assist in that destruction and to take power into its own hands.’
‘But stress has come to be laid primarily on those concepts which relate most specifically to the Soviet regime itself:’
- ‘to its position as the sole truly Socialist regime in a dark and misguided world, and to the relationships of power within it.’
‘The first of these concepts is that of the innate antagonism between capitalism and Socialism.’
‘This brings us to the second of the concepts important to contemporary Soviet outlook.’
- ‘That is the infallibility of the Kremlin.’
- ‘The Soviet concept of power, which permits no focal points of organization outside the Party itself, requires that the Party leadership remain in theory the sole repository of truth.’
‘But we have seen that the Kremlin is under no ideological compulsion to accomplish its purposes in a hurry.’
‘In these circumstances it is clear that the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.’
‘It is important to note, however, that such a policy has nothing to do with outward histrionics: with threats or blustering or superfluous gestures of outward "toughness." '
- ‘While the Kremlin is basically flexible in its reaction to political realities, it is by no means unamenable to considerations of prestige.’
‘Like almost any other government, it can be placed by tactless and threatening gestures in a position where it cannot afford to yield even though this might be dictated by its sense of realism.’
III
‘In the light of the above, it will be clearly seen that the Soviet pressure against the free institutions of the Western world is something that can be contained by the adroit and vigilant application of counterforce at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy, but which cannot be charmed or talked out of existence.’
IV
‘It is clear that the United States cannot expect in the foreseeable future to enjoy political intimacy with the Soviet regime.’
- ‘It must continue to regard the Soviet Union as a rival, not a partner, in the political arena.’
- ‘It must continue to expect that Soviet policies will reflect no abstract love of peace and stability, no real faith in the possibility of a permanent happy coexistence of the Socialist and capitalist worlds, but rather a cautious, persistent pressure toward the disruption and weakening of all rival influence and rival power.’
‘Balanced against this are the facts that Russia, as opposed to the western world in general, is still by far the weaker party, that Soviet policy is highly flexible, and that Soviet society may well contain deficiencies which will eventually weaken its own total potential.’
- ‘This would of itself warrant the United States entering with reasonable confidence upon a policy of firm containment, designed to confront the Russians with unalterable counterforce at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interest of a peaceful and stable world.’