CHINAMacroReporter

Is The U.S. Ceding Global Leadership To China?

'China isn't positioned to replace the U.S. as a global leader anytime soon.'—Hard on President Trump's 'American First' inaugural address, Xi Jinping gave a rousing paean to globalism at the World Economic Forum. And, immediately the hot question became: 'Is the U.S. ceding global leadership to China?' Yes and no, says Bill Overholt of the Harvard Asia Center. Yes, the U.S. is ceding global leadership. No, China won’t replace the U.S. What will replace the U.S. is ‘G-Zero’, a world with no single global leader. Not China, not the U.S. So, can his critics lay this outcome at President Trump’s feet?
by

|

CHINADebate

February 27, 2017
Is The U.S. Ceding Global Leadership To China?

[Malcolm Riddell's conversation with Bill Overholt]

  • The U.S. has been ceding global leadership since the end of the Cold War.
  • But, China — often cited as the likely successor to the U.S. — is not yet ready to assume leadership.
  • Instead, we are headed for is a ‘G-Zero’ world, with no single global leader. Not the U.S. and not China.

Hard on President Trump's 'American First' inaugural address, Xi Jinping gave a rousing paean to globalism at the World Economic Forum. And, immediately the hot question became: 'Is the U.S. ceding global leadership to China?'

Yes and no, says Bill Overholt of the Harvard Asia Center. Yes, the U.S. is ceding global leadership. No, China won’t replace the U.S.

What will replace the U.S. is ‘G-Zero’, a world with no single global leader. Not China, not the U.S.

So, can his critics lay this outcome at President Trump’s feet? Again, yes and no.

Yes, President Trump's ‘America First’ policies and his disdain for international regimes in trade, climate change, and defense, as well as his treatment of some of the U.S.’s greatest allies, has certainly accelerated America’s global retreat.

But, no, too. Because the U.S. retreat began well before President Trump took office. As Bill points out…

1. Is The U.S. Ceding Global Leadership To China?

The headlines are all about President Trump, and a lot of that is appropriate, but there are much deeper trends that are more important in the long run.
When Americans are not concerned about a great war or a Cold War, they get less interested in foreign policy when they elect a president.

Thus, since the end of the Cold War, we have elected presidents - from Bill Clinton and George W. Bush to Barack Obama and now Donald Trump - who came to office with no foreign policy experience.

And, we can see a parallel trend in Congress...

What's happened since the Cold War is that Congress has generously funded the military.
But, the State Department and economic aid budgets have been cut and cut and cut. That's a continuous process that has been going on since the 1990s.
Again, Trump is the ultimate caricature of that, trying to take an already minuscule State Department budget and cut it by another 30%, but he's on trend.

The result: 'The principal tools of successful strategy are being eroded at the same time when the top leaders are less experienced, less knowledgeable, and less interested in national strategy and foreign policy.' No wonder American has been losing influence globally.

But, regardless of the causes, the U.S. retreat could still benefit China.

Take Australia, as an example. Headlines there say that Canberra is 'now thinking it needs to tilt more toward China because the U.S. is such an unreliable ally.'

And that, it's 'starting to take more Chinese priorities into consideration’ on issues ranging from South China Sea to free trade.'

If our foreign policy can push even Australia - perhaps our most faithful ally - toward China, how much more will it drive our less stalwart Asian allies toward Beijing?

So, if China isn't destined for global leadership, can it nonetheless supplant the U.S. as the regional leader in Asia? Bill has his doubts about that too. 

2. In A G-Zero World, Will China Dominate Asia?

  • A G-Zero World is coming, where the U.S. will be first among several other powers - but no longer global leader
  • China will become the second most important power and the leader of Asia, propped up by countries alienated by President Trump
  • Still, the extent of Beijing’s regional hegemony hinges on whether it can overcome an array of domestic and international challenges.

Last week, Bill Overholt of Harvard’s Asia Center, presented an intriguing case for why China will not replace the U.S. as global leader (in case you missed it, you can watch our conversation here.)

Instead of a world led by China or the U.S., for that matter, Bill posited a G-Zero world, without any dominant hegemon. In contrast to...

A G-1 one world with one leader like the U.S.
A G -2 world would be a world where the U.S. and China were collaborating to create a world order, as to some extent they have been for a quarter century.
In the G-Zero world, the U.S. and China will be one and two, respectively globally. But...
China will be the regional leader in Asia.
We're not talking about everybody joining an alliance with China. That's not going to happen.
But, on trade issues, on local strategic issues, the Chinese voice is going to get stronger and stronger.
And, even a powerful country like South Korea will be more and more influenced by Chinese views.

And as China consolidates its dominance in what it considers its backyard, there is no guarantee that long-time friendly Pacific powers like Thailand, Philippines, or even Australia will support the U.S. as they used to.

Still, China’s regional hegemony is not a given. According to Bill, the extent of  Beijing’s leadership will depend on Zhongnanhai’s...

  • Successfully implementing its ‘One Belt, One Road’ initiative
  • Tamping down the quibbling over minor territorial issues with its neighbors, and
  • Completing economic – and, especially SOE - reform.

How will Beijing carve out a place for itself in this more anarchic reality? How will neighboring nations, who long have prioritized economic growth over military spending, respond to a new Chinese push for Asian domination? And, the crucial question: is war between China and the U.S. inevitable?

3. What 'Thucydides Trap'? Why China & the U.S. Won't Go to War

'It was the rise of Athens [China] and the fear that this instilled in Sparta [the U.S] that made war inevitable.' - Thucydides -(with apologies) 

Like Zeus, the Thucydides Trap has lost its power

Thucydides, 2,400 years ago, summed up the cause of the Peloponnesian War this way: 'It was the rise of Athens and the fear that this instilled in Sparta that made war inevitable.'

In more recent times, political scientists have used the simple equation rise of new power + fear of reigning power = war to explain the cause of about a dozen major armed conflicts. The latest to apply the formula is Graham Allison in his Destined for War: Can America and China Escape the Thucydides's Trap?.

So can we escape? According to Bill Overholt, the question itself is wrong: The Thucydides Trap died in World War II.He argues that since World War II. 

the geopolitical landscape has experienced 'one of the greatest transformations in world history'...   

‘The people who use the Thucydides Trap for analysis - John Mearsheimer and a dozen of other political scientists, including now Graham Allison - focus on the period before World War II.'What they miss is the strategic divide between the pre-World War II era when traditional military and territorial approaches were the way to build a powerful and successful country, and the post-World War II modern world where those approaches are more likely to be self-defeating.' 

Because the proponents of Thucydides Trap analysis focus on the previous world order, they miss entirely that...   

'The game is now going to be decided more by economics. I'm not talking about economic interdependence. I'm talking about the fact that economics is the key to success if you're a realist in the modern world - and this is something that political science realists have never focused on. 'What you do today to achieve power is pour your money into your country's economic success, not make territorial conquests or have overwhelming military superiority. 'This post-World War II change from using military force to using economic development to gain power is one of the greatest transformations in world history.'   

In this new world order, where economics trumps force, the U.S. and China have little reason to go to war...   

'Never have two countries gotten so much economic advantage from dealing with each other than the U.S. and China have. 'There's going to be constant pressure on both sides for leaders to realize that and not to mess it up.'   

And, of course, not go to war.

More

CHINAMacroReporter

September 26, 2022
China Coup: How Worried Should Xi Be?
‘Xi and the phrase #ChinaCoup trended on social media after tens of thousands of users spread unconfirmed rumors that the president was detained and overthrown by the China's People's Liberation Army.’
keep reading
September 18, 2022
'How do you spy on China?'
Many of you have asked about my own take on the issues I analyze in these pages and about my background. Today is some of both.I am honored to have been interviewed by the terrific Jeremy Goldkorn, editor-in-chief of The China Project. Below is part of that interview.
keep reading
September 5, 2022
Xi’s Dangerous Radical Secrecy
In a world of political hardball, investigative reporting, and tabloids, we know a lot (if not always accurate or unspun) about world leaders, especially those in functioning democracies. Not so with Xi Jinping.
keep reading
February 18, 2021
'Like It Or Not, America Is Still A Superpower'
‘The twentieth century was littered with the carcasses of foreign leaders and governments that misjudged the United States, from Germany (twice) and Japan to the Soviet Union to Serbia to Iraq. Perhaps the Chinese, careful students of history that they are, will not make the mistake that others have made in misjudging the United States.’
keep reading
February 16, 2021
'Is China experiencing an advance of the state sector?'
‘The value-added produced by state-owned enterprises has usually been in the range of 25-30% of China’s GDP. And what’s really striking about those numbers is that they just haven’t changed very much over the past 25 years. The share of China’s economic output being produced by SOEs today, under Xi Jinping, is not significantly different than it was under Hu Jintao, or even in the later years of Jiang Zemin.’
keep reading
February 16, 2021
‘China Blocked Jack Ma’s Ant IPO After Investigation Revealed Likely Beneficiaries’
‘Behind layers of opaque investment vehicles that own stakes in Ant Financial are a coterie of well-connected Chinese power players, including some with links to political families that represent a potential challenge to President Xi and his inner circle. Those individuals, along with Mr. Ma and the company’s top managers, stood to pocket billions of dollars from a listing that would have valued the company at more than $300 billion.’
keep reading
February 14, 2021
How to Keep U.S.-Chinese Confrontation From Ending in Calamity
'The two countries need to consider something akin to the procedures and mechanisms that the United States and the Soviet Union put in place to govern their relations after the Cuban missile crisis—but in this case, without first going through the near-death experience of a barely avoided war.'
keep reading
February 14, 2021
The United States, China, and Taiwan: A Strategy to Prevent War
‘We believe that a crisis is building over Taiwan and that it is becoming the most dangerous flashpoint in the world for a possible war that involved the United States of America, China, and probably other major powers.'
keep reading
February 13, 2021
Why China Will Go Green - Really
‘To Communist Party leaders, greenery increasingly aligns with their economic and political interests. China, a populous country that is cruelly lacking in clean water and arable farmland, and which hates having to rely so heavily on imported energy, has a selfish interest in embracing what President Xi Jinping calls “ecological civilisation”.’
keep reading
February 11, 2021
'The Biden Team Wants to Transform the Economy. Really.'
‘Biden and his more activist advisers hope to modernize key industries and counter an economic threat from China, swiftly emerging as the world’s other superpower. “The package that they put together is the closest thing we’ve had to a broad industrial policy for generations, really,” says Scott Paul, the president of the Alliance for American Manufacturing.’
keep reading
February 10, 2021
‘What the ‘Hong Kong Narrative’ gets wrong'
‘For a significant cohort of the [“pro-democracy”] protesters, the more accurate label would be “anti-China activists.” The one thing that seems to unite them is not a love of democracy, but a hatred of China.'
keep reading
February 8, 2021
Why the Anglosphere sees eye to eye on China
‘Some of America’s European allies are very wary of what they fear will be a new cold war with China. By contrast, the US is getting more support from the UK, Australia and Canada.’
keep reading
February 7, 2021
' "Longer Telegram" | To Counter China’s Rise, the U.S. Should Focus on Xi'
A strategy that focuses more narrowly on Xi, rather than the CCP as a whole, presents a more achievable objective.'
keep reading
February 7, 2021
'The Sources of Soviet Conduct'
'The main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.’
keep reading
February 7, 2021
'Remarks by President Biden on America's Place in the World'
“We’ll confront China’s economic abuses; counter its aggressive, coercive action; to push back on China’s attack on human rights, intellectual property, and global governance.”“But we are ready to work with Beijing when it’s in America’s interest to do so. We will compete from a position of strength by building back better at home, working with our allies and partners, renewing our role in international institutions, and reclaiming our credibility and moral authority, much of which has been lost.”“That’s why we’ve moved quickly to begin restoring American engagement internationally and earn back our leadership position, to catalyze global action on shared challenges.”
keep reading
February 7, 2021
'In Search of Today’s George Kennan'
‘Kennan provided a framework to break through the bitter divide between those who believed America should return to its prewar isolationism, and those who believed the USSR was itching for a dramatic showdown with the capitalist west.’
keep reading
February 7, 2021
' "Longer Telegram" Sets Off Fierce Global Debate'
'The fierce global debate set off this week by a thought-provoking paper - “TheLonger Telegram: Toward a New American China Strategy” – has underscored the urgency and difficulty of framing a durable and actionable U.S. approach to China as the country grows more authoritarian, more self-confident and more globally assertive.'
keep reading
February 7, 2021
The 'Longer Telegram' & Its Discontents
Why everyone wants to be George Kennan‘In 1947 X penned his history-changing “Sources of Soviet Conduct” in Foreign Affairs,’ wrote Edward Luce in the Financial Times in 2018.‘The piece, which crystallised America’s cold war containment strategy, was the making of George F Kennan’s life-long reputation as a master of geopolitics.’‘ As the architect of a doctrine that won the cold war.’
keep reading
February 7, 2021
'Brookings experts analyze President Biden’s first foreign policy speech: Focus China'
'To respond effectively, Biden argued, America will need to rebuild leverage, e.g., by pursuing domestic renewal, investing in alliances, reestablishing U.S. leadership on the world stage, and restoring American authority in advocating for universal values.'
keep reading
February 7, 2021
'Why the ‘Longer Telegram’ Won’t Solve the China Challenge'
‘Perhaps the most problematic aspect of the 'Longer Telegram's' emphasis on Xi—“All U.S. political and policy responses to China therefore should be focused through the principal lens of Xi himself”—is the author’s conclusion that Washington should be seeking to escape from, and even try to effect the removal of, Xi’s leadership because that could restore U.S.-China relations to a potentially constructive path: “its pre-2013 path—i.e., the pre-Xi strategic status quo.” ’
keep reading
February 4, 2021
Why Beijing Is Bringing Big Tech to Heel
‘Beijing’s recent antitrust efforts are motivated less by worries about the tyrannical nature of monopoly power than by the belief that China’s tech giants are insufficiently committed to promoting the goal advanced by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) of transformative technological innovation—and thus may be undermining the effectiveness of Chinese industrial policy.’
keep reading
February 3, 2021
'Secretary of State Antony Blinken on U.S. Policy Toward China'
‘There’s no doubt that China poses the most significant challenge to us of any other country, but it’s a complicated one.’
keep reading
February 3, 2021
'Burma’s Coup and Biden’s Choice'
‘The top U.S. priority in Asia is limiting Beijing’s ability to control independent states like Burma, which is strategically situated in the Indo-Pacific. The U.S. response needs to take into account China’s regional designs.’
keep reading
February 3, 2021
'Myanmar, Burma and why the different names matter'
‘Unlike most of the world, the U.S. government still officially uses "Burma." '
keep reading
February 3, 2021
'Coup a further complication for tricky Myanmar-China ties'
‘Even if China played no role at all in ousting Suu Kyi, Beijing is likely to gain still greater sway over the country.’
keep reading
February 3, 2021
‘Beijing Won’t Let America “Compartmentalize” Climate Change'
‘‘You want China to take action on climate change?" asks Xi Jinping. "Let’s talk about what you’re going to give to get it.’’
keep reading
February 3, 2021
Burma: At the Center of the U.S.-China Competition
In today’s issue: 1. China Lays Out Its Position / 2. The U.S. Lays Out Its Position / 3. Burma: At the Center of the U.S.-China Competition / 4. Burma or Myanmar?
keep reading
February 3, 2021
'A Conversation with Politburo Member Yang Jiechi'
‘History and reality have shown time and again that these issues concern China's core interests, national dignity, as well as the sentiments of its 1.4 billion people. They constitute a red line that must not be crossed.’
keep reading
February 3, 2021
'National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan on U.S. Policy Toward China'
‘Being prepared to act as well to impose costs for what China is doing in Xinjiang, what it’s doing in Hong Kong, for the bellicosity of threats that it is projecting towards Taiwan.’
keep reading
February 3, 2021
'Coup Puts Myanmar at the Center of the U.S.-China Clash'
‘Chinese oil and gas pipelines snake across Myanmar from China’s landlocked Yunnan province to the Bay of Bengal—a route that Beijing wants to transform into a broader economic corridor with road and rail connections.’
keep reading
February 3, 2021
'Biden's whole-of-National Security Council China strategy'
'National security adviser Jake Sullivan is personally focused on China as a priority, building capacity across departments and agencies and running processes that break down old silos between foreign and domestic policy.'
keep reading
January 31, 2021
'Biden’s Nightmare May Be China'
‘The coming years represent the greatest risks since I began covering U.S.-China relations in the 1980s, partly because Xi is an overconfident, risk-taking bully who believes that the United States is in decline.’
keep reading
January 31, 2021
Opinion | Marco Rubio: 'China is exploiting U.S. capital markets and workers. Here's what Biden should do.'
‘China can finance its industrial ambitions with the deepest, most liquid capital markets in the world — our own.’
keep reading
January 31, 2021
The UK Stands Up, the U.S. Not So Much
“We have honored our profound ties of history and friendship with the people of Hong Kong, and we have stood up for freedom and autonomy—values both the U.K. and Hong Kong hold dear.” British Prime Minister Boris Johnson
keep reading
January 31, 2021
'U.S.-China Capital Flows Vastly Underestimated'
‘And yet, debates around US-China passive securities investment suffer from shortcomings similar to those inherent in the early debates about US-China bilateral FDI and VC: official data do not provide a clear picture for policymakers to understand the scope and patterns of two-way investment flows and stocks.’
keep reading
January 31, 2021
'Why U.S. Securities Investment in China is Vastly Underestimated'
‘The conduits of US securities investment in China that are obscured or ignored in the US Treasury International Capital (TIC) dataset constitute a majority of all holdings, so these figures vastly underestimate the true scope at the end of 2020.’
keep reading

Heading

Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit. Suspendisse varius enim in eros elementum tristique. Duis cursus, mi quis viverra ornare, eros dolor interdum nulla, ut commodo diam libero vitae erat. Aenean faucibus nibh et justo cursus id rutrum lorem imperdiet. Nunc ut sem vitae risus tristique posuere.