CHINAMacroReporter

Is China's Economic Power a Paper Tiger?

The People’s Republic of China has surely seen faster GDP growth than the United States for most of the past forty years. It's the value of that growth that's questionable. : The Chinese economy is strange in many ways. Not only is it a hybrid between private capital and state control, but very few people directly invest in the mainland — and yet everybody is interested in how the second largest economy in the world is going to develop. That’s because Chinese demand determines the prices of world commodities, and the operations of multinational companies in China impact earnings. When the yuan falls, markets across the world get jittery. China watchers accept the fact that official Chinese data is severely flawed, and often simply fabricated, yet they still use it to analyze the Chinese economy and markets because there are few alternatives. One alternative, however, is the China Beige Book International (CBB), a research service that interviews thousands of companies and hundreds of bankers on the ground in China each quarter. They collect data and perform in-depth interviews with Chinese executives.
by

|

The National Interest

November 27, 2017
Is China's Economic Power a Paper Tiger?
This article is appeared on The National Interest

GDP Is Overrated, or Worse

It seems strange to say this with China having reported faster growth in gross domestic product (GDP) for decades. First, it’s worth asking if and when Beijing will admit that its economy struggled. For instance, China reported 7.9 percent GDP growth for the second quarter of 2009 yet continued the world’s largest loan program, and saw much of it turn to debt despite the supposedly fast growth. It’s almost as if the economy did not do nearly as well as the Communist Party claimed.

Still, the People’s Republic has almost surely seen faster GDP growth than the United States for most of the past forty years. The question is its value. For ordinary Chinese, disposable income (as reported by Beijing) is less than halfof GDP per capita. Disposable income is money that can actually be spent while GDP per capita is an accounting device, with little relevance in the real world.

Even less relevant is GDP adjusted by purchasing power parity (PPP). PPP requires computing a price level for all of China and comparing it to all of America, itself slightly absurd. It relies on “the law of one price”—arbitrage across open markets causing prices for the same product to equalize. Chinese market barriers mean arbitrage often fails. Related, PPP is meant to apply to consumer buying power, while consumption is less than 50 percent of Chinese GDP. GDP adjusted by purchasing power is a poor measurement for many countries, including China.

Net Private Wealth

Simple GDP is better than that, but it’s far from the only measurement and may not be the most important. The resources available to countries to pursue national interests are captured in net national wealth, which again takes the form of money that can be spent rather than an accounting result. If conceptualized and measured accurately, annual GDP should capture contributions over time to the stock of wealth. It should be not be surprising that Chinese GDP turns out not to be tightly associated with wealth.

Credit Suisse compiles net private wealth in most national economies going back to 2000. The data are unstable in that there can be later revision, so the most recent results should be considered tentative. Against that, there are two reassuring features: (i) any bias should be considerably smaller than the bias of the Chinese government and (ii) the results do reflect China’s rise through 2012.

From 2000–2012, net private Chinese wealth jumped from $4.66 trillion (less than India’s today) to $21.7 trillion, close to a 14 percent annual growth rate. American net private wealth over the same period rose from $42.3 trillion to $67.5 trillion. While the absolute advantage for the United States expanded, it did so by only $8 trillion because U.S. annual growth was only four percent. China was easily outperforming.

The situation has changed sharply since then. From the end of 2012 to the middle of 2017, Chinese net private wealth has climbed $7.3 trillion, annual growth never touching 9 percent. American net private wealth jumped $26 trillion. The American base was much bigger and American growth also became a bit faster. The result: mid-2017 Chinese net private wealth was $29 trillion and American net private wealth was over $93 trillion. The Federal Reserve supports the Credit Suisse number, putting American household net worth at $96 trillion.

Just as GDP is not the perfect measurement of economic performance, nor is private wealth. Neither provide information about growing global concerns about inequality. But wealth does reframe the U.S.-China discussion. Claims that China is about to eclipse the United States are untenable in the face of $64 trillion less in net private wealth. Claims that China is outpacing the United States are challenged by the private wealth gap widening by $18 trillion in the past four and a half years after widening by less than half that the previous twelve years. In terms of private wealth, China is barely visible in America’s rear mirror.

The Public Sector

Of course Credit Suisse could just be wrong about the PRC. And there are two more questions to raise. The first is whether U.S. dominance since 2012 reflects American stock and property bubbles being bigger than China’s property bubble, so that the gap will narrow when all bubbles pop. This is entirely possible, but will not matter much. Private wealth declines of the magnitude seen during the global financial crisis, for instance, would leave the U.S. $56 trillion ahead, the same-size gap as 2014.

The fundamental limitation of net private wealth lies in “private.” It is total national wealth which enables pursuit of national interest—the public sector must be included. This is not an easy task. The Party suppresses information on debt problems in the PRC’s huge banking system. The U.S. government’s evaluation of public-sector assets is questionable. However, U.S. federal debt and gross Chinese state assets are both very large, narrowing the wealth gap.

There are official Chinese data on state corporate assets that at least have been internally consistent for some years. These put mid-2017 gross assets at 145 trillion yuan and liabilities a bit over ninety-five trillion yuan, for $7.4 trillion in net state corporate assets at official exchange rates. However, there are strong incentives for state firms to overstate assets and understate debt. This corporate asset figure should be seen as a maximum.

Other public liabilities include central and local government debt. These are considerably smaller than state corporate debt—their official level was $4.1 trillion at the end of 2016. Beijing’s numbers for this have become suspiciously stable and a comparable Bank of International Settlements (BIS) number is $1.1 trillion higher at the end of March 2017, rising such that $5.3 trillion can be used as the mid-2017 estimate.

The biggest state asset beyond corporate holdings is land. It is generally difficult to assign value to large amounts of land because mass sales would cause prices to plummet. It is more difficult in the PRC due to the government’s distorting role. Data over time on revenue from land sales imply a very round value of state land assets of $3.7 trillion at the end of 2016. It is probably a bit higher by mid-2017, though sales are unstable.

This land value could be too low, just as corporate liabilities are probably too low. But the errors run against each other, leaving a rough estimate of public sector assets as adding $6 trillion to net private wealth. Chinese national wealth mid-2017 is therefore approximately $35 trillion, perhaps a bit higher.

On the American side, the main event is federal debt, $19.8 trillion in mid-2017. State and local debt added almost $3 trillion to that. Simple. The problem lies with assets, meaning property.

The federal government owns over 27 percent of all U.S. land while state and local governments push that above 33 percent. Estimates of the worth of this land run from less than $3 trillion for federal and local combined to more than $125 trillion for just federal (using dubious assumptions about commodities). The Federal Reserve puts U.S. government nonfinancial assets at $14 trillion in mid-2017, $10 trillion in state and local government buildings, so its figure for U.S. net wealth exceeds $88 trillion.. But selling those buildings would crush prices, implying a far lower present value.

An indirect calculation based on broader Federal Reserve real estate data yields $9.1 trillion in combined government assets mid-2017. This puts the American public sector position at negative $13.6 trillion and net national American wealth a little below $80 trillion. The wealth gap closes when the public sector is incorporated, but it’s still huge.

American Choices

Land value estimates are imprecise, at best. Asset prices mean wealth can shift sharply. The Credit Suisse private wealth data have been—and can again be—revised. But Credit Suisse, the U.S. Treasury, the Federal Reserve, the BIS, and even the Chinese government (with respect to state corporates and land sales) provide cohesive data over time.

The United States is nearly $45 trillion ahead of China in net national wealth. Further, the gap is not presently closing. It is not closing in private wealth in isolation, it is not according to BIS debt data, and it is not according to this calculation method which utilizes Chinese reporting. In this sense, faster Chinese GDP growth is revealed as somewhat meaningless, at least starting this decade.

If America chooses not to compete with China in East Asia or lead globally, then no wealth advantage matters. When and where we choose to compete, the resource advantage rests overwhelmingly with us, and it will for the indefinite future.

More

CHINAMacroReporter

February 8, 2021
Why the Anglosphere sees eye to eye on China
‘Some of America’s European allies are very wary of what they fear will be a new cold war with China. By contrast, the US is getting more support from the UK, Australia and Canada.’
keep reading
February 7, 2021
' "Longer Telegram" | To Counter China’s Rise, the U.S. Should Focus on Xi'
A strategy that focuses more narrowly on Xi, rather than the CCP as a whole, presents a more achievable objective.'
keep reading
February 7, 2021
'The Sources of Soviet Conduct'
'The main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.’
keep reading
May 27, 2021
'Demography + Technology is Destiny'
The census showed that the number of births nationwide fell to the lowest level since 1961, following a nationwide, manmade, famine caused by Mao’s “Great Leap Forward” that killed tens of millions of people, and that China’s total population could peak in the next few years.
keep reading
May 27, 2021
'China: Births Falling'
‘China’s total population could peak in the next few years, spurring profound changes for the world’s second-biggest economy.’
keep reading
May 27, 2021
'Demography + Technology is Destiny'
The census showed that the number of births nationwide fell to the lowest level since 1961, following a nationwide, manmade, famine caused by Mao’s “Great Leap Forward” that killed tens of millions of people, and that China’s total population could peak in the next few years.
keep reading
May 27, 2021
'China: Getting Old Before Getting Rich'
‘Over the past two generations, China has seen a collapse in fertility, exacerbated by Beijing’s ruthless population-control programs.’ ‘With decades of extremely low fertility in its immediate past, decades more of that to come, and no likelihood of mass immigration, China will see its population peak by 2027.’
keep reading
May 27, 2021
'China Bets on Productivity Over Population to Drive Its Economy'
‘Beijing has a two-pronged approach to maintaining economic growth as its population shrinks.’ ‘First, it intends to slow the decline of the urban workforce by raising the retirement age and encouraging migration of more of the country’s 510 million rural residents to cities.’ ‘Second, it plans to raise productivity -- a measure of economic output per worker -- with the latest five-year plan emphasizing better vocational education and more investment in scientific research, automation and digital infrastructure.’ [see second chart above]
keep reading
May 27, 2021
'China: Getting Old Before Getting Rich'
‘Over the past two generations, China has seen a collapse in fertility, exacerbated by Beijing’s ruthless population-control programs.’ ‘With decades of extremely low fertility in its immediate past, decades more of that to come, and no likelihood of mass immigration, China will see its population peak by 2027.’
keep reading
May 27, 2021
'China: Births Falling'
‘China’s total population could peak in the next few years, spurring profound changes for the world’s second-biggest economy.’
keep reading
May 27, 2021
'Why Demographics is (Close to) Destiny'
‘Demographics may not be destiny, but for students of geopolitics, they come close.’
keep reading
May 27, 2021
'Sex and the Chinese Economy'
‘A rise in China’s male-female ratio may have contributed to between one-third and one-half of the increase in its trade surplus with other countries.’ ‘The sex imbalance thus likely underpins an important source of tension between China and the US. Yet bilateral engagement has paid scant attention to this linkage.’
keep reading
May 27, 2021
'Lousy demographics will not stop China’s rise'
‘The old maxim ‘demography is destiny’ no longer holds in the same way that it used to.’ ‘A shrinking and ageing population may not have the same gloomy implications in the 21st century.’
keep reading
May 20, 2021
'Apple in China: No Plan B'
“This business model only really fits and works in China. But then you’re married to China.” ‘The Chinese government was starting to pass laws that gave the country greater leverage over Apple, and Mr. Xi would soon start seeking concessions. Apple had no Plan B.’
keep reading
May 20, 2021
'Tim Cook and Apple Bet Everything on China.'
‘For Apple, a clean break with China is impossible.’
keep reading
May 20, 2021
'Apple held hostage by its Chinese puzzle'
"The massive and complete supply chain ecosystem in China is key to the iPhone maker's success, but it has also created a gigantic organism that would struggle to move somewhere else."
keep reading
May 20, 2021
‘Censorship, Surveillance and Profits: A Hard Bargain for Apple in China’
‘Apple built the world’s most valuable business on top of China. Now it has to answer to the Chinese government.’
keep reading
May 20, 2021
Apple in China
‘But just as Mr. Cook figured out how to make China work for Apple, China is making Apple work for the Chinese government.’ ‘Behind the scenes, Apple has constructed a bureaucracy that has become a powerful tool in China’s vast censorship operation.’
keep reading
May 20, 2021
'Apple Reaches $2 Trillion'
“This business model only really fits and works in China. But then you’re married to China.” ‘The Chinese government was starting to pass laws that gave the country greater leverage over Apple, and Mr. Xi would soon start seeking concessions. Apple had no Plan B.’
keep reading
May 15, 2021
‘Scenario Three: Leadership Challenge or Coup
‘By removing de jure term limits on the office of the presidency — and thus far refusing to nominate his successor for this and his other leadership positions — Xi has solidified his own authority at the expense of the most important political reform of the last four decades: the regular and peaceful transfer of power.’
keep reading
May 15, 2021
Invitation to a Trivium Flash Talk: 'China's Data Environment from a Big-Picture Perspective.’
‘This talk is designed to cut through the tech and legal jargon, and lay out the top-level strategic rationale underpinning China's thinking on data. We'll cover:’
keep reading
May 15, 2021
Invitation to a Trivium Flash Talk: 'China's Data Environment from a Big-Picture Perspective.’
‘This talk is designed to cut through the tech and legal jargon, and lay out the top-level strategic rationale underpinning China's thinking on data. We'll cover:’
keep reading
May 15, 2021
After Xi: A Succession Crisis to Rock the World
A new risk to add to your analyses and strategic planning: A succession crisis in China. By removing term limits on his stay in office and by not naming a successor, Secretary General Xi Jinping ‘has pushed China towards a potential destabilising succession crisis, one with profound implications for the international order and global commerce,’ writes Richard McGregor of the Lowy Institute and Jude Blanchette of the Center for Strategic & International Studies
keep reading
May 15, 2021
‘Scenario Four: Unexpected Death or Incapacitation'
‘Even if the CCP’s claim that Xi Jinping has no designs to remain in office for life is true, his evisceration of succession norms leaves the country ill-prepared for his sudden death or incapacitation.’
keep reading
May 15, 2021
'Regime change in China is not only possible, it is imperative.'
‘We must make regime change in China the highest goal of our strategy towards that country.’ ‘The US and its allies cannot dictate to China the political system by which it is governed. But they can and must engineer conditions which embolden and enable those in China who also want regime change to achieve it.’
keep reading
May 15, 2021
After Xi: A Succession Crisis to Rock the World
A new risk to add to your analyses and strategic planning: A succession crisis in China. By removing term limits on his stay in office and by not naming a successor, Secretary General Xi Jinping ‘has pushed China towards a potential destabilising succession crisis, one with profound implications for the international order and global commerce,’ writes Richard McGregor of the Lowy Institute and Jude Blanchette of the Center for Strategic & International Studies
keep reading
May 15, 2021
'Regime change in China is not only possible, it is imperative.'
‘We must make regime change in China the highest goal of our strategy towards that country.’ ‘The US and its allies cannot dictate to China the political system by which it is governed. But they can and must engineer conditions which embolden and enable those in China who also want regime change to achieve it.’
keep reading
May 15, 2021
'After Xi: China's potentially destabilising succession crisis'
‘By removing de jure term limits on the office of the presidency — and thus far refusing to nominate his successor for this and his other leadership positions — Xi has solidified his own authority at the expense of the most important political reform of the last four decades: the regular and peaceful transfer of power.’ ‘In doing so, he has pushed China towards a potential destabilising succession crisis, one with profound implications for the international order and global commerce.’
keep reading
May 15, 2021
‘Scenario One & Two: Xi Steps Down'
‘In this scenario, Xi thwarts the current consensus by handing over his leadership positions to at least one individual from the current Politburo Standing Committee (as per existing regulations).’
keep reading
May 12, 2021
The Poem that Cost Billions
The billion dollar losses that came from quoting an 1,100-year-old poem, toWhy foreign companies in China have Stockholm Syndrome
keep reading
May 10, 2021
'A 1,100-Year-Old Poem Cost Meituan’s Outspoken CEO US $2.5 Billions'
‘On Monday, because of an 1,100-year old poem about events 2,200 years ago posted by the founder of food delivery giant Meituan, investors panicked, and sank the company’s market cap by $15.6 billion. And Meituan CEO Wang Xing, who posted the poem, lost $2.5 billion of his wealth.’
keep reading
May 9, 2021
'The Housing Bubble That Just Won’t Pop'
‘China’s cities are plagued by a diverging trend: high demand and exorbitant prices for residential properties in tier 1 cities and yet an oversupply in smaller, lower-tiered cities.’
keep reading
May 7, 2021
'Would China really invade Taiwan?'
‘Is Taiwan really "the most dangerous place on earth?" No. Or at least, not right now.’
keep reading
May 7, 2021
'Don't Help China By Hyping Risk Of War Over Taiwan'
‘China is marshaling its full range of capabilities to intensify pressure on Taiwan below the threshold of conflict.’ ‘Beijing's goal is to constantly remind Taiwan's people of its growing power, induce pessimism about Taiwan's future, deepen splits within the island's political system and show that outside powers are impotent to counter its flexes.' ‘Its approach is guided by the Chinese aphorism, "Once ripe, the melon will drop from its stem [瓜熟蒂落]," ’‘This strategy may require more time than war, but it would come at less cost and risk to Beijing.’
keep reading
May 7, 2021
'China Threat: A "perception gap" between the U.S. and Taiwan'
‘While the U.S. talks up the medium-term military threat, the democratic island sees the moves as part of a bigger, more immediate problem: "gray zone" warfare from Beijing that is meant to wear down the morale of not just the Taiwanese military, but also the island's people.’
keep reading
May 7, 2021
'The most dangerous place on Earth'
‘Taiwan is an arena for the rivalry between China and America.’ ‘Although the United States is not treaty-bound to defend Taiwan, a Chinese assault would be a test of America’s military might and its diplomatic and political resolve.’
keep reading
May 7, 2021
'The Most Dangerous Place on Earth'
‘China's top priority now and in the foreseeable future is to deter Taiwan independence rather than compel unification,’ note Richard Bush (Brookings (retired)), Bonnie Glaser (German Marshall Fund in America), and Ryan Hass (Brookings Institution)
keep reading

Heading

Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit. Suspendisse varius enim in eros elementum tristique. Duis cursus, mi quis viverra ornare, eros dolor interdum nulla, ut commodo diam libero vitae erat. Aenean faucibus nibh et justo cursus id rutrum lorem imperdiet. Nunc ut sem vitae risus tristique posuere.