As I was watching the astonishing Camp David meeting among the leaders of Korea, Japan, and the U.S., an old question popped into my head:

• Why does Xi Jinping continue his belligerence toward advanced democracies when that belligerence encourages them to band together more strongly against China?

Between China and the U.S., each side blames the other for the deterioration of the relationship.

• And it really is a 'which came first, the chicken or the egg' kind of question – with each country calling the other the chicken who laid the egg.

This no doubt means that I see Mr. Xi as the chicken and his belligerence as an irrational egg because I am an American.

• But taking the Chinese point of view, the whole picture changes – and  'Mr. Xi' is replaced with ‘the American President.’

If it weren’t for Taiwan, who’s right or wrong wouldn’t make a lot of difference.

• Otherwise, just a lot of words, words, words.

But China’s actions toward Taiwan have shot past mean words to outright military threats.

• (And the Chinese blame the U.S. for this, claiming the U.S. is not living up to its agreements, is encouraging Taiwan independence, and is interfering in China’s internal affairs – just as the U.S. blames China for abandoning ‘peaceful reunification.’)

Because the stakes over Taiwan are so high, it’s worth asking:

• What if one leader or the other were to act outside what we consider the ‘rational actor model’? (More on that model later from a great essay in Foreign Affairs, ‘The Unpredictable Dictators: Why It’s So Hard to Forecast Authoritarian Aggression.’)?

For our discussion today, though, let’s just ask about one side: What if that leader is Mr. Xi?

• What if - based on flawed views of China's military capability, bad intelligence, or a misreading of Taiwan and U.S. intentions – or just an impulse – Mr. Xi orders the blockade or invasion of Taiwan?

All our careful analyses of PLA capabilities, the parsing of Mr. Xi’s and Mr. Biden’s statements, the predictions as to the year of the invasion, everything – all out the window.

• This is one you won’t see coming – but one you have to have prepared for.

1 | Pigs fly
Last week the leaders of Korea and Japan, hosted by Joe Biden at Camp David, participated in the first ‘Trilateral Summit.’

• From that meeting came ‘The Spirit of Camp David: Joint Statement of Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the United States.’

If someone had shown me the Joint Statement even a year ago, I would have repeated one of my mother’s favorite phrases for expressing incredulity: ‘When pigs fly.’

• This is an extraordinary document, well-worth reading.

Unlike other doomed attempts at some sort of Korea-Japan détente, this one seems to have a chance of sticking.

• For good reason. Xi Jinping’s belligerence toward each nation and toward much of Asia in general has scared the bejesus out of countries that heretofore were pretty lukewarm in joining the U.S. against China.

Add to this event:

• The trilateral security partnership  -  AUKUS – among Australia, the U.K. and the U.S.
• The Quad – U.S., Japan, Australia, and a reluctant India – could strengthen into a security agreement.
• Let’s not forget Southeast nations’ displeasure over China’s bullying (see the South China Sea) – even the Philippines, which had been flirting with China, has now announced plans to expand the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Arrangement (EDCA) with the U.S.
• I’ll stop here.

Mr. Xi is fond of saying:

• ‘The East is rising, the West is declining.’

The East is rising all right – rising in opposition to China.

2 | Then there’s Europe.
Europe’s move toward the U.S. stance toward China over the last few years has amazed me almost as much as the Korea-Japan rapprochement.

• While individual European countries have taken a range of positions toward China, both the EU and NATO have been fairly direct, using ever tougher language.

In a speech that is one of the best short analyses of China’s aims, EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said:

• ‘President Xi essentially wants China to become the world's most powerful nation.’

‘There are three broad conclusions we can draw on how China is changing’:

1. ‘We can expect to see a greater focus on security – whether military, tech or economic.’
2. ‘The imperative for security and control now trumps the logic of free markets and open trade.’
3. ‘The Chinese Communist Party's clear goal is a systemic change of the international order with China at its centre.’

In the same vein, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg wrote in ‘A Stronger NATO for a More Dangerous World’ in Foreign Affairs:

• ‘The Chinese government’s increasingly coercive behavior abroad and repressive policies at home challenge NATO’s security, values, and interests.’
• ‘Beijing is threatening its neighbors and bullying other countries.’
• ‘It is trying to take control of critical supply chains and infrastructure in NATO states.’
• ‘We must be clear-eyed about these challenges and not trade security interests for economic gains.’

NATO has also followed the U.S. in stitching itself, albeit more loosely, together with advanced democracies in Asia. More from Mr. Stoltenberg’s essay:

• ‘As autocratic regimes draw closer to one another, those of us who believe in freedom and democracy must stand together.’

‘NATO is a regional alliance of Europe and North America, but the challenges we face are global.’

• ‘That is why I have invited the leaders of the European Union and of our Indo-Pacific partners—Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea—to join us in Vilnius [for the 2023 NATO summit .]’
• This is the second year in a row to invite them.

3 | Is this guy crazy?
So here’s the paradox.

• In a speech a few months ago, Mr. Xi asserted, ‘Western countries led by the United States have implemented all-around containment, encirclement and suppression of China, which has brought unprecedented severe challenges to our country’s development.’
• But, you might argue, if Mr. Xi hadn’t been so belligerent, all these countries wouldn’t feel the need to contain, encircle, and suppress China.
• And because Mr. Xi is ever more belligerent, he’s getting more of the same treatment.

Whether China is the chicken or the egg responsible for these responses, you would think that, regardless, Mr. Xi would dial back the scary rhetoric and actions in the hope of easing the encirclement.

• Nope.

By Mr. Xi’s remaining in this, forgive the term, vicious cycle, you might ask:

• Is this guy crazy?

No, I would argue, not crazy.

• Just working off a different worldview and different priorities - and these may not be leading to, from a U.S. point of view anyway, optimal policies and outcomes.

4 | What kind of world does Xi Jinping want?
Analyses trying to make sense of Mr. Xi’s foreign policy, which seems counterproductive to many, abound.

• But the best concise statement of Mr. Xi’s aims comes from Harvard’s Tony Saich in ‘What kind of world does Xi Jinping want?’:

‘So, what kind of a world does Xi want to see? Two major principles drive his view.’

• ‘First, security and sovereignty issues must all be aligned to ensure the continued rule of the Chinese Communist Party.’
• ‘Second, he insists that China be seen as at least an equal player in the world, making it a key participant in defining the rules of the road.’

5 | ‘Security and sovereignty’
Dr. Saich’s noting Mr. Xi’s need to align ‘security and sovereignty’ may suggest an answer to the paradox.

• Sure, Mr. Xi’s belligerence weakens China’s ‘security’ because it encourages the advanced democracies – which heretofore supported ‘the peaceful rise of China’ – to join the U.S. in, well, encircling China.

But what is weakened in ‘security’ is perhaps made up for in Mr. Xi’s mind in defending China’s ‘sovereignty.’

• China has shown it will push back on any perceived foreign intrusion into its internal affairs, whether that’s in Hong Kong or Xinjiang or anywhere.
• In doing so, Mr. Xi no doubt also feels that, as Dr. Saich suggests, China’s position as an ‘equal play in the world’ is enhanced.

As China’s ‘Wolf Warrior’ ambassador to France, Lu Shaye, explains in a 2021 interview, ‘Our diplomatic style has changed now, and you have to adapt to our new style’ [“我们现在外交风格变了，你们要适应我们的新风格”]:

• ‘There is a very strong anti-China force in Western society.’

‘They don't want China to speak out, but they want to unilaterally attack and discredit China and think China will not respond.’

• ‘Once China responds and strikes back, they are not happy.

‘Westerners accuse us of not conforming to diplomatic etiquette.’

• ‘But the standard we evaluate our work is not how foreigners see us, whether foreigners are happy or not.’

‘Our standard is how fellow citizens see us:’

• ‘Whether our people are satisfied or dissatisfied, whether they are happy with our actions or not.’

By making the people satisfied and happy, Mr. Xi helps, as Dr. Saich says, ‘to ensure the continued rule of the Chinese Communist Party.’

• But is a marginal step for ensuring Party rule – which already appears pretty darn strong – by antagonizing the advanced democracies so that they band together against China this way worth it?

I would suggest that this course of action – even though it makes sense to Mr. Xi - could be outside the ‘rational actor model.’

6 | ‘Rational Actor Model’
Not long ago, I briefed a government pension fund and was asked if my view on China’s possible invasion of Taiwan had changed. I answered that the overall view hadn’t changed:

• Mr. Xi would, I believe, continue to pressure Taiwan to unify until he became convinced that this wouldn’t work – then, if China had the capability, he would blockade or invade Taiwan.
• How long that would be is anyone’s guess (and plenty of people are guessing).

But I added a new part.

• During Mr. Xi’s second term, I had come to see him as an ‘incompetent dictator’ in so many ways that I didn’t feel certain that he might not just make a bad or dumb decision and invade Taiwan – a real wild card.

Then, as if on cue, Foreign Affairs published ‘The Unpredictable Dictators: Why It’s So Hard to Forecast Authoritarian Aggression,’ which said:

• ‘Policymakers and analysts typically use a “rational actor model” to make predictions.’

• ‘In keeping with its name, the model holds that policymakers will act rationally.’

Models, including the ‘rational actor model,’ ‘are especially bad at predicting the actions of autocrats.’

• ‘Unlike in democracies, where the political process includes checks and balances that can stop bad decisions, authoritarian regimes have very limited, if any, checks on their leaders.’
• ‘Often, dictators ensconce themselves in an echo chamber that shields them from even hearing dissenting views.’

7 | ‘Be ready for a Chinese attack on Taiwan—even if it defies common sense.’
From our ‘rational actor model’ point of view, it defies common sense that Mr. Xi would keep being so belligerent that the advanced democracies are lining up against China – and not get anything we think of as commiserate in return.

• So is Mr. Xi necessarily a ‘rational actor’ about Taiwan?

An argument can be made: No.

• Unlike his predecessors, Mr. Xi has, without needing to, made reunification on his watch central - he's committed to it.
• But, by trashing Hong Kong’s ‘one country, two systems’ – the same one on offer to Taiwan - he has left Taiwan with no attractive path to unification.
• Worse, the white paper on China-Taiwan relations after unification isn’t a deal the Taiwanese (or anyone) would ever agree to.

So, Mr. Xi may have simply painted himself into a corner here – with the only out a war or at least a blockage (that may lead to war).

• Like I said, an ‘incompetent dictator.’

Still, when analysts opine on the question if or when Mr. Xi will invade, they measure military capabilities; parse Mr. Xi’s speeches; and declare the year he most likely will invade – all very rational.

• But they don’t opine about the possibility that Mr. Xi will convince himself that the time is now and order an invasion for no better reasons than he had to alienate the advanced democracies or to narrow the paths to unification with Taiwan.

In their Foreign Affairs essay, authors Keren Yarhi-Milo and Laura Resnick Samotin write:

• ‘It is unlikely that China has the military capabilities needed to take the island, which would require carrying out the largest amphibious operation in history.’

• ‘As a result, most analysts tend to believe an invasion is unlikely anytime soon.’

‘But this line of thinking assumes that Chinese leader Xi Jinping knows it would be impossible to seize and hold Taiwan without paying an enormously high price.’

• ‘In other words, it assumes that Xi is a rational actor when, in reality, he may not be.'

‘Instead, surrounded by supplicants, Xi could persuade himself that a war for Taiwan would be fast.’

• ‘He could believe, as Putin did with Ukrainians, that Chinese troops would be welcomed by many Taiwanese people.’
• ‘He could decide that neither the United States nor its allies would come to the island’s defense.’

‘These assumptions are plainly wrong.’

• ‘But Xi would not be the first leader to make decisions that are disastrously incorrect.'

‘Washington, then, needs to be ready for a Chinese attack on Taiwan—even if it defies common sense.’

• And so do we.

Here's a break from hearing my views.

This issue highlights the insights of China expert, Bill Zarit:

• Career Minister, U.S. Foreign Service (retired)
• former Chairman, AmCham China
• Now, Senior Counselor at The Cohen Group, a consultancy founded by former Secretary of Defense William Cohen.

Fascinating and useful insights from a leading China expert from on the ground in Beijing and Washington.

• You will find the edited transcript of our conversation, below.
  

‘US, China Dig In Despite Hopes for Thaw’ reads a headline from Voice of America.

• ‘The United States and China appear no closer to easing mounting tensions despite a recent flurry of diplomatic activity by high-profile U.S. officials to the Indo-Pacific region.’

Still, as Bill Zarit pointed out to me:

• ‘U.S.-China government-to-government communication - is resuming.’

‘And the direction is for more and better communication.’

• ‘This is one of the critical points of getting the relationship back on track.’

‘Though I don’t see much changing from the Chinese side during its present administration,’

• ‘We can still communicate.’
• ‘We can also find common ground to help lower the temperature and avoid serious conflict.’

One reason the Biden administration isn’t making much headway with communication is China’s appraisal of the U.S. side of the relationship.

• ‘In so many of the meetings I have had in China,’ Bill says, ‘Chinese officials and former officials, with only one exception, blame the U.S. entirely for the deteriorating relationship.’

‘From these meetings, as well as my own observations, I don't see that much is going to change with the way China is looking at the US during the current Chinese administration.’

• ‘With continuity of leadership in China, we're going to have a similar trajectory.’

That trajectory might change if U.S. communication were to include full U.S. responsibility for scuttling the relationship and promises to meet China ‘halfway.’

• Since that isn’t going to happen, I don’t have much hope for progress.

Instead the Biden administration is signaling it wants to communicate but only as it strengthens itself.

• ‘"Deterrence today is real, and deterrence is strong," Ely Ratner, U.S. assistant secretary of defense for Indo-Pacific security affairs, told lawmakers Thursday during a hearing focused on Washington’s China policy,’ reports VOA.

‘Speaking alongside Ratner, Daniel Kritenbrink, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, told lawmakers:’

• ‘ "Intense competition requires intense diplomacy," he said. "We are committed to managing this competition responsibly and to maintaining open lines of communication with the PRC.” ’

Communication, like deterrence, can be seen as a tactic.

• Tactics to deal with China the Biden administration has – a strategy, not so much.

‘From what I've seen, the U.S. doesn't seem to have a China strategy,’ says Bill.

• ‘Now, we've got tactics.'

• ‘But we really don't have an end game.’

He contrasts this with China.

• ‘The Chinese, on the other hand, certainly have a strategy, and they're putting all of their efforts into realizing the goals of the strategy: modernization, becoming a major power in the world, and “common prosperity” ’ - to name just three.

These are a few of the many insights Bill Zarit shared with me during two long conversations.

• Bill Zarit is more formally the ‘Honorable William Zarit,’ having retired from the U.S. Foreign Service with the rank of ‘Career Minister’ (the equivalent of the U.S. Army/Marine rank of lieutenant general).

• Today, he is Senior Counselor at The Cohen Group, a consultancy founded by former Secretary of Defense William Cohen, ‘where Zarit advises western multinationals working in the Chinese commercial market.’
• From long experience living and working in China, he is among the most astute observers of China today.
• (You can find Bill’s bio here.)

Bill's latest insights derive from three recent activities:

• He has just returned from five months in China (where he had lived for many years previously and now splits his time between there and the U.S.). While in China, he met with senior Chinese officials and heads of foreign businesses.
• As a former Chairman of AmCham China, he participated in AmCham China’s annual weeklong ‘Washington Doorknock,’ where he met with senior administration officials, and legislators, and think tanks to gage the contours of U.S. policy toward China and to provide input from those on the ground in China.
• He spoke at and took part in the U.S. Chamber / AmCham China – ‘Annual China Business Conference’ (a conference, Bill believes is the best of its kind), sharing observations and absorbing the thoughts of other experts on the beleaguered relationship.

He has consolidated his thoughts from these three events into ‘Eight Points.’

• Bill agreed to let me share them here on condition that I make clear: He is speaking for himself and not for AmCham China or The Cohen Group.

Before I get to the Eight Points, I realized as Bill and spoke that sprinkled throughout his comments were phrases such as:

• ‘For me, goal number one is what is in the interest – short, medium, and long term - of the United States.’

• ‘To stay competitive globally and to the benefit of the country, U.S. companies need to be in China.’
• ‘The point is: How do we work with China in the interests of the United States?’

Taken together, I sum all these up into a touchstone:

• ‘Does it benefit the U.S.?’

This is a deceptively powerful way to frame discussion of an issue.

• The question doesn’t suggest an answer.

• But it sets up a useful starting point for analysis of policy and action.
• And it narrows the path for the sides to talk past each other.

An analysis that begins with Bill’s question - ‘Does it benefit the U.S.?’ – changes the focus and tenor of the discussion.

• It moves away from the all too common and not very useful (except politically) China-bashing to a more dispassionate consideration of the issues.
• May not feel as good but should lead to better policies.

Next time you read about a new policy toward China or a comment from an official or legislator – or are just thinking about a China policy – ask Bill’s question:

• ‘Does it benefit the U.S.?’ - and see if you don't arrive at a sharper understanding.

On to Bill Zarit’s Eight Points:

Point 1 | China blames the U.S.

‘In so many of the meetings I have had in China,’ Bill says, ‘Chinese officials and former officials, with only one exception, blame the U.S. entirely for the deteriorating relationship.’

• ‘Most of them really believe that the U.S. that is responsible for the deterioration of this relationship.’

• ‘Propaganda plays a role, but certainly also divergent historical and cultural viewpoints.'

‘In the US, we tend to blame China for the disputes.’

• ‘But I think we are more clear-eyed, and realize that it is both sides who are involved in the deterioration of the relationship.’

‘And the fact is, both sides are responsible.’

• ‘And both sides have to approach the problems looking at it that way.’

‘From these meetings, as well as my own observations, I don't see that much is going to change with the way China is looking at the US during the current Chinese administration.’

• ‘With continuity of leadership in China, we're going to have a similar trajectory.’

Point 2 | ‘The U.S. has tactics but doesn’t seem to have a China strategy.’

‘From what I've seen, the US doesn't seem to have a China strategy.’

• ‘Now, we've got tactics.’

• ‘And some of those tactics are competing in areas where we need to compete, aligning where we should be able to cooperate.’
• ‘But we really don't have an end game.’

‘The Chinese, on the other hand, certainly have a strategy, and they're putting all of their efforts into realizing the goals of the strategy.’

• ‘Modernization, becoming a modern society and a modern economy by 2049.
• ‘Becoming a major power in the world. The regional power for Asia at least and even more influential throughout the world.’
• ‘The “common prosperity” effort - which frankly is hard to fault as a concept - to continue to bring people out of poverty and to have the majority of the people in the country living a reasonably good life.’
• ‘This is all fairly clear.’

‘With all this in mind, I know that with such rapid changes taking place in China, plus an aggressive leadership there, it's difficult to have a clear strategy.’

• ‘But isn’t that when strategy is needed even more?’

• ‘We need to get clear on where the US wants to be in five, ten years vis-à-vis China, and the rest of the world for that matter.'
• ‘And don’t we need to focus on America’s long-term interests in this world that at times seems to be upside down.’

‘Do we know how to deal with a China that is increasingly strong and influential - and to deal with it in a way that's going to benefit the United States?’

• ‘Because for me priority number one is the interest of the United States, the long-term interests of the United States.’

Point 3 | ‘The presence of U.S. businesses in China is in the interest of the U.S.’

‘The U.S. business presence in China is in the interests of the U.S.’

• ‘To stay competitive globally and to the benefit of the country, U.S. companies need to be in China.’
• ‘I think this is an important point that we need to stress with the Hill and the administration.’

‘That said, we hear certain US officials claim that our companies are supporting the Chinese Communist Party and that these firms need to get out of China.’

• ‘U.S. businesses that have been in China for 20 or 30 years are now under attack by some of our own political leadership.’

‘How is it that U.S. companies are supporting the Chinese Communist Party?’

• ‘Some say since our companies are doing business in China, they are paying taxes, employing people, transferring technology, all of which benefits the Chinese economy.’

‘Those who are critical of U.S. business in China will make the argument that, by extension, we are also supporting the Chinese Communist Party.’

• ‘But I feel that the benefits far outweigh the risk.’

‘To stay competitive - and again to the benefit of our country - U.S. companies need to be in China.’

• ‘And that’s what we need to stress with the Hill and even with the administration.’

‘Here there are two of the main benefits to the U.S.:’

1. ‘China is a “stress test” or “fitness center” for U.S. companies (an idea I stole from Joerg Wuttke, who just stepped down as long-time president of the EU Chamber of Commerce in China).’
2. ‘U.S. companies influence China through the way we manage our companies, including our democratic values, labor rights, environmental protection, rule of law, intellectual property protection, and anti-corruption.’

‘Let me first explain the idea of China as a “stress test” or a “fitness center” for U.S. companies operating there.’

• ‘China is becoming one of the most competitive markets in the world.’

• ‘At the same time, China’s marketplace is becoming more discerning.’
• And, in response, the Chinese are producing increasingly competitive products and technologies.’

‘Because of these realities, operating in China focuses and sharpens U.S. companies.’

• ‘If you're competing successfully in China you will have a much better chance of competing globally.’
• ‘And without that competitive edge, it's going to be very difficult for our companies to compete globally.’

‘Second, U.S. companies encourage the adoption of U.S. values in China.’

• ‘We run our companies with democratic values, including labor rights and a sense of rule of law.’
• ‘We also operate with respect for intellectual property and environmental protection, and with a definite respect for anti-corruption.’

• ‘And the more U.S. companies influence China to adopt these values, the greater the benefit to the U.S.’

Point 4 | ‘We are witnessing cognitive dissonance in China. China is in the midst of a charm offensive to attract foreign investment and foreign technology; at the same, we are seeing raids on companies.’

‘We seem to be getting some cognitive dissonance out of China.’

‘On the one hand, coming from the top in China is a charm offensive targeting foreign business.’

• ‘The Chinese leadership has realized that for economic and development reasons, foreign investment and foreign technology need to continue to come into China.’
• ‘So you hear, for example, the leadership promoting foreign investment in China.’

‘Then on the other hand, China is passing laws - anti-espionage laws, national security laws, cyber security laws - that are very restrictive to data sharing, data flows.’

• ‘Now it seems that economic data of all kinds is such a sensitive national security issue that China is restricting them.’

'Based on these laws, the Chinese are investigating and raiding U.S. companies that provide data and other information to businesses, and taking Chinese employees into custody, all without explaining what's going on.’

• ‘Research and consulting companies in China are the eyes and the ears of foreign investors.’

‘For investment to come into China - for Western companies or foreign companies to feel comfortable and to want to continue working in China - they need to access to data.’

• ‘Investors just want to know what's going on in China economically.’
• ‘This is normal. This is not espionage.’

‘Frankly, I haven't heard anything from the China side that would help explain this cognitive dissonance.’

• ‘I'm not sure where this is coming from. Could it be China’s security people are not talking with the economic people?’

‘We do know, of course, that for the present Chinese administration, national security is job number one.’

• ‘The economy is still important, but it seems to be secondary now to political and security considerations.’

‘The bottom line is that national security really trumps everything else.'

• ‘And again, this is antithetical to what China is trying to do on the economic development side.’

Point 5 | ‘Communication is critical.’

‘During the weeklong AmCham China ‘Doorknock’ in Washington, there was little good news about the U.S.-China relationship from the administration, the Hill, or think tanks.’

• ‘That said, communication – U.S.-China government-to-government communication - is resuming.’

‘And the direction is for more and better communication.’

• ‘This is one of the critical points of getting the relationship back on track.’

‘Though I don’t see much changing from the Chinese side during its present administration,'

• 'We can still communicate.’
• ‘We can also find common ground to help lower the temperature and avoid serious conflict.’ 

Point 6 | ‘Moderate U.S. Congress members agree to keeping the trade lanes open with certain parameters, having better communications with China, and working with allies in dealing with China.’

‘The AmCham China ‘Doorknock’ team had meetings on the Hill with a number of thoughtful, moderate, reasonable legislators and staff members.’

• ‘The response was better than I had expected.’
• ‘In a word, I was encouraged.’

‘That’s because what we heard in most of the meetings was very much in agreement with what we were thinking:’

• ‘Keep the trade lanes open with certain parameters - because keeping those trade lanes open benefits our country;’
• ‘Have more communication at all levels of the government. And we seem to be going in that direction;’
• ‘Work with allies and partners - something that this administration certainly has done successfully; and’
• ‘Restart people-to-people engagement with China.’

‘Moderate U.S. Congress members met with us, as did some others who are tougher on China, yet reasonable.’ 

• ‘But unfortunately few people who are really hawkish on China did (would?) meet with us.

‘A note regarding the risk of war, my sense is that we're not going to go to war.’

• ‘I don't see how going to war is in the interest of anybody.’

• ‘And I would assume that most of our policymakers agree with that.’

‘But from the rhetoric we have heard on the Hill and elsewhere in Washington, I don't think we can totally assume that everyone wants to avoid that.’

• ‘There is talk about going to war with China – though it seems to me that much of it is just performative.’

‘Performative or not, when the Chinese hear it, they're alarmed.’

Point 7 | ‘The House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party seems to be anti-China, believing that everything China does is bad.’

‘The  Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party appears to be dominated by anti-China folks.’

• ‘The Committee seems to be anti-China, believing that everything China does is bad.’
• ‘And I'm not so sure that that's going to be all that constructive.’

‘We met with the leadership of the Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party.’

• ‘My take on the Select Committee - having watched the initial hearing – is how one-sided it seemed to me.’

‘The folks in Congress and especially the folks on the Select Committee are saying that it's bipartisan, and I agree.’

• ‘Also there is room within the committee for members to have differences of opinion, some more hawkish, some less hawkish.’

‘But while bipartisan, I don't think it's unbiased.’

• ‘This is based on the witnesses called for the first hearing: They were all China Hawks.’

‘Yes, I agree with much of what the China Hawk witnesses said. There is usually at least a kernel of truth.’

• ‘But by just inviting China Hawks as witnesses, it looks as if everything China does is bad.’

• ‘And that is not necessarily true. I don't think that's true.’
• ‘Going forward, I hope the Select Committee will be more evenhanded.’

‘I mentioned to some Select Committee folks that it seems very anti-China.’

• ‘And there was pushback.’

‘In defense of the Committee leadership and the people who are speaking for the committee, the committee is inviting companies and other folks to later hearings.’

‘I would hope that they would also listen to folks who are on the ground in China.’

• ‘It's not that we are biased in favor of China - that's not the point.’

‘The point is:’

• ‘How do we work with China to the benefit of the United States?’
  

Point 8 | ‘The U.S. needs national review of outward investment to China, but it has to be narrow and targeted and done in conjunction with our allies and partners.’

‘I agree that there is a need for the U.S. to have certain outbound investment controls.’

• ‘I know that that flies in the face of free investment flows and so forth.’

‘But I think under the present circumstances that we do need to protect our technology.'

• ‘And this is one way to do it.’

‘The folks who are making policy and implementing policy on a national review of outward investment understand that it needs to be targeted and narrow.’

• ‘And that we need to work in conjunction with our allies and partners.’

‘So I was encouraged to hear - from the administration and from people very intimately involved with putting these policies together - that that's how this investment review is going to go.’

On Saturday morning, June 24, a friend called and asked: ‘Have you seen the news?’

• I said no, and he said, ‘Well, get on the TV.’

What I saw there was of course the Wagner Group marching on Moscow.

• Then, the fizzle.

Can’t imagine that when Xi Jinping first heard of the Wagner Group’s march, he didn’t think:

• Do I have any Prigozhins around me?

And no doubt just as fast as the question came into his head, so did the answer:

• No.

Unlike Mr. Putin, Mr. Xi has absorbed the first principle for successful autocrats:

• Don’t set up an independent army outside your control.
• (That’s also a lesson from China’s Warlord Era a century ago that I cover in the last section - don't miss it, really interesting.)

Still, the march on Moscow was a surprise.

• And this led me to look again at how likely such a surprise against Mr. Xi might be.

I had to ask:

• Is Mr. Xi coup-proof?

1 | False alarm

The Wagner march reminded me that about a year ago, rumors abounded that Xi Jinping had fallen from a military coup. As Newsweek reported:

• ‘Chinese President Xi Jinping became one of the top trending topics on Twitter amid unsubstantiated reports he is under house arrest and that China is in the midst of a military coup.’ 
• ‘Xi and the phrase #ChinaCoup trended on social media after tens of thousands of users spread unconfirmed rumors that the president was detained and overthrown by the China's People's Liberation Army.’

Being without basis, this fizzled faster than the march on Moscow.

• But the march also reminded me that Mr. Xi and other senior cadre have themselves reported concerns about ‘plots’ and ‘traitors.’

2 | Sic semper tyrannis

‘Plots to overthrow Xi and his administration are not the product of fevered imaginations but rather have been widely spoken of by senior Chinese officials, including Xi Jinping himself,’ wrote Richard McGregor and Jude Blanchette in 2021.

• ‘Many date back to the early months of 2012, underlining Xi’s belief that rivals wanted to prevent him from taking over leadership of the CCP later that year.’

• ‘Others are vague and amorphous accusations of unnamed “plots” by anonymous “traitors” that are likely levelled to justify Xi’s shakeup of the party bureaucracy and his wide-reaching intra-party discipline campaigns.’

Real or justifications, an autocrat always has to watch his back.

• As an expert, when commenting on President Biden’s calling Mr. Xi a dictator, wrote on a China forum:

‘Dictators for life probably have a hard time buying life insurance.’

• ‘If they do not cultivate a successor and make it clear they’ll relinquish power gracefully, they’ll end up “eliminated with extreme prejudice” as the mob used to say.’
• ‘I’m talking to you, PUTINHEAD, Emperor Xi, and fat guy in North Korea.’

Sic semper tyrannis.

3 | What keeps an autocrat up at night?

‘If you are an autocrat, who do you have to fear? Like, what keeps you up at night?'

• ‘Not just Xi Jinping, but any autocrat,' asks Yale’s Dan Mattingly in the Pekingology podcast ‘Does Xi Jinping face a coup threat?’ 

‘In the popular imagination, what an autocrat has to fear is unrest.’

• ‘He has to fear protestors in the street, storming the gates and taking him down.’

‘Generally though, what has led to the unconstitutional exit of authoritarian leaders from office isn't mass protest, isn't mass uprising.’

• ‘Instead, it's coups; it's other elites taking down the leader. And that's really what autocrats have to worry about.’

'And who launches coups that are successful nine out of 10 times?’

• ‘The military.’

‘So if you're an autocrat, what you really have to be nervous about is:’

• ‘What's the military doing, and is the military coming after me?’

4 | Xi’s military-coup-proofing

‘You can't completely rule out a military coup against Xi,’ says Dr. Mattingly,

• ‘with this caveat:’

‘I do think that Xi's done enough to make it really hard to launch a successful military coup against him,'

• ‘Between promoting people who are loyal to him and promoting left-behind officers who aren't well connected to other civilian elites and other military elites, he's done enough on the military side to make it hard to get military buy-in for a coup to occur.'

‘And there are a number of other factors that push against it.'

• ‘Number one is a real sense of unity and national force that Xi Jinping has effectively stoked by first painting the United States as a threat to China.'
• ‘Number two is the rhetoric about the role of the Party as an important force in China's very revival.'
• ‘Number three is Xi's laser focus on making sure the military is loyal.'

5 | ‘The guys with the guns’

Until a few years ago, I would have said that, like Xi’s regime, the American presidency was immune from a coup.

• Now we know it can be touch & go.

In the ‘60s, I encountered ‘Seven Days in May,’ both as a novel and a movie.

• The plot: The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is thwarted from staging a coup to overthrow the President and take power.

In 2020, this played out, but sort of in reverse.

• The plot: The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff vowed to thwart a defeated American president from using the U.S. military to stay in power.

Re 2020, Carol Leonnig and Philip Rucker report in ‘I Alone Can Fix It: Donald J. Trump’s Catastrophic Final Year’:

• ‘As Trump ceaselessly pushed false claims about the 2020 presidential election, Gen. Mark A. Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, grew more and more nervous, telling aides he feared that the president and his acolytes might attempt to use the military to stay in office.’
• ‘They're not going to F'ing succeed,’ Milley said. ‘You can't do this without the military. You can't do this without the CIA and the FBI.’
• ‘We're the guys with the guns.’

That you can’t do it without the guys with the guns is something both Mao and Mr. Xi get:

• Mao: ‘Our principle is that the Party commands the gun, and the gun must never be allowed to command the Party.’ Mao Zedong, Problems of War and Strategy, November 1938
• Xi: ‘The party must command the gun…. We [will] enhance the political loyalty of the armed forces [and] strengthen them through the training of competent personnel.’ Xi Jinping, Speech on the CCP’s 100th Anniversary, July 2022

But there is one big difference here:

• In the U.S., the guys with the guns swear allegiance to the American Constitution (thank you, General Milley).

• In China, to the Chinese Communist Party.
  

6 | ‘The Party commands the gun.’

But it’s more than the Party controlling the PLA.

• The PLA is charged with guaranteeing the continued rule of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

The CCP oversees the PLA through its Central Military Commission.

• To ensure Party control, the General Secretary of the CCP concurrently serves as the Chairman of the Central Military Commission.

‘Soon after coming to power, President Xi Jinping made sure that the PLA was firmly under the Party’s control by purging numerous generals,’ notes Oxford's Rana Mitter.

• ‘As they follow coverage of Putin having to admit that a major Russian city was occupied by a rival army, the Chinese Politburo will have no doubts that their ruthlessness in military matters has paid off.’
  

7 | 'Proficiency in battle ranks fourth'

In ‘China’s military set-up is designed to foil any would-be Prigozhin,’ Charles Parton notes:

• ‘The People’s Liberation Army is an explicitly political force — and the ultimate guarantor of the party’s hold on power.

‘The People’s Liberation Army is the Chinese Communist party’s army and not a national army.’

• ‘ “Our principle is that the party commands the gun, and the gun must never be allowed to command the party,” said Mao Zedong.’

‘Whatever Yevgeny Prigozhin was plotting in Russia last week — mutiny, insurrection, civil war — this level of military insurrection would never have been possible in China.’

• ‘The idea that anyone outside the PLA and the People’s Armed Police might have the right to bear arms is anathema.’ 

‘Xi’s military reforms, listed in order of priority, consisted of:’

1. ‘reinforcing ideological commitment to the party, ‘
2. ‘recruiting and promoting the right people,’
3. ‘the fight against corruption,’
4. ‘proficiency in battle and political innovation.’

‘It is striking that the ability to fight wars ranked only in fourth place.’

• ‘But this is no surprise, given that the PLA is the ultimate guarantor of the party’s hold on power (in Russia, by contrast, it has traditionally been Putin’s security services, rather than the army, who fulfil this role).’

‘Even at times of chaos, such as during the Cultural Revolution, the PLA, while restoring order, has never acted against the party.’

• ‘It acquiesced as Mao removed its leader Lin Biao, just as it did when Deng Xiaoping and Xi removed top generals.’

‘If there were to be a severe leadership split which led to economic meltdown, the PLA might align with one or other political faction.’

• ‘But at present there is only one faction in China and it is Xi’s.’

8 | What about the guys without guns?

So if Mr. Xi doesn’t face a rogue army or a military coup…

• How about a coup by Party elites?

In ‘After Xi: Future Scenarios for Leadership Succession in Post-Xi Jinping Era,’ Richard McGregor and Jude Blanchette point out:

• ‘It is true that Xi has a host of enemies in the party.’

• But ‘the chances of a coup being mounted against Xi at the moment, absent a systemic crisis, are exceedingly small.’

‘It is equally true that the barriers to organising against him are near insurmountable.’

• ‘Successfully organising a coup against an incumbent leader — especially one in a Leninist one-party state — is a daunting challenge.’

‘Given the technological capabilities of the CCP security services, which Xi controls, such an endeavour is fraught with the risk of detection and the possible defection from early plotters who change their mind.’

• ‘Despite their enormous power, senior members of the CCP and the PLA lack the basic ability to move about and communicate unnoticed by Xi’s all-seeing security apparatus.’
• ‘Xi’s increasing grip over domestic security services means that the communication between would-be challengers necessary for arranging logistical details would be next to impossible.’

9 | Afterword: ‘The Return of the Warlords’

If he didn’t get that lesson not to permit independent armies from the handbook for autocrats, Mr. Xi would have learned the lesson from Chinese history. As Oxford’s Rana Mitter notes in ‘The Return of the Warlords’:

• ‘A hundred years ago, it was China, not Russia, that was split by “warlords” and weakened by chronic conflict between their private armies.'

In 1911, a revolution overthrew China’s last dynasty, the Ching.

• And a republic was formed but didn’t last long.

‘China’s brief republican experiment was quickly overcome by a contest between military groups.’

• ‘China was divided into regions ruled by local armies.
• ‘The term “warlord” (junfa) was used pejoratively to describe their commanders.’

‘The effects of divided authority were obvious and grim.’

• ‘No one ruler could lay claim to all of China, and military leaders were constantly forming alliances that fell apart amid internecine fighting.

This map gives an idea of the regions and the changes in territory during China’s Warlord Era. (Sorry for the poor quality, but it makes the point in general.)

‘Patriotic activists lamented that the danger confronting China had become twofold:

• ‘imperialism from outside, warlordism from inside.’

‘In 1928, Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek established a government that nominally unified China.’

• ‘Yet he spent much of the next ten years fighting rival military leaders as well as the Communists (forcing the latter on the famous Long March in 1934).’

‘In 1937, war broke out with Japan, and in some cases, warlords cut their own deals with the invaders, seeking to preserve their regional power.’ 

‘Once the Communists had won the Civil War in 1949, Mao moved to crush all possible alternative sources of power in China.’

• ‘The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was established as the Party’s army, not the national army. That is still its status today.

‘The collective memory of the warlord period is one reason why China’s leaders are determined to keep military force firmly under the ruling Communist Party’s control.’

Hence, Mr. Xi isn’t in danger of a rogue army marching on Beijing.

• Because there are no rogue armies in China.

And unlike the Russian army, the PLA stands loyally poised to fight any threat to Mr. Xi and the Party.

Sorry about the long absence.

• My back was giving me a heck of a time – but better now. Great to be back.
• Thanks to all of you who inquired about my absence.

Away from being on the computer every day, I had more time to muse about China.

• And about Xi Jinping.

I’ll cover three of those musings today.

1. Mr. Xi has global ambitions but scant resources to achieve them; he may be counting on his worldview, ‘the East is rising, the West is declining,’ to compensate for the resources he lacks.
2. Mr. Xi is an autocrat, not just because he hails from a Leninist party, but because autocracy has been in the Chinese political DNA for more than 2,000 years; faced with foreign challenges to autocracy Chinese emperors never faced, he is working to make the ‘world safe for autocracy’ - especially China's.
3. Mr. Xi is painfully aware of China’s frustration and prior humiliation at the hands of the West and Japan and sees himself as the restorer of the Middle Kingdom, putting China again atop the world order.

PART ONE | XI JINPING’S GLOBAL AMBITIONS & RESOURCES

[.cmrred]1 | ‘Change unseen in 100 years is coming.’
Among the many events during my absence, I was struck by Mr. Xi’s comment as he was leaving Moscow after his 40^th meeting with Vladimir Putin:

• ‘Change is coming that hasn’t happened in 100 years. And we’re driving this change together.’

What change does Mr. Xi have in mind?

• A broad outline can be found in the March 30 speech on EU-China relations by EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen.
• Besides defining the change, she presented the most concise – and in my view, most clear-eyed – assessment of China and its objectives and actions. I cannot encourage you more to read it.
• She noted, as I did above:

‘Most telling were President Xi's parting words to Putin on the steps outside the Kremlin when he said:’

• ‘Right now, there are changes, the likes of which we have not seen for 100 years. And we are the ones driving these changes together.'

Throughout her speech, she outlined what change Mr. Xi seeks to accomplish and how:

1. ‘We heard that last October when President Xi told the Communist Party Congress that by 2049 he wanted China to become a world leader in ‘composite national strength and international influence'.’

• ‘Or to put it in simpler terms: He essentially wants China to become the world's most powerful nation.’

2. ‘In his report to the recent Party Congress, President Xi told the Chinese people to prepare for struggle.’

• ‘It is no coincidence that he used in his opening speech the words ‘douzheng' and ‘fendou' repeatedly – which both can be translated as struggle.’

‘This is indicative of a world view shaped by a sense of mission for the Chinese nation.’

3. ‘[T]he Chinese Communist Party's clear goal is a systemic change of the international order with China at its centre.’

• ‘We have seen it with China's positions in multilateral bodies which show its determination to promote an alternative vision of the world order.’
• ‘One, where individual rights are subordinated to national security.’
• ‘Where security and economy take prominence over political and civil rights.’

[.cmrred]2 | But will they have China’s back in a fight?
Do Mr. Xi and Mr. Putin and their friends have the economic, political, and military firepower to drive such change against the array of advanced democracies?

• Doubtful.

No doubt Mr. Xi has thrown in with Mr. Putin for the long run.

• But, given the showing in Ukraine, Russia is proving to be, as someone put it, ‘a gas station with nukes’ – still, we can’t ignore the nukes.

Mr. Xi has one ally, North Korea, and a number of friends, including Russia, Iran, Pakistan, and others.

• Even accounting for China’s economic and growing military might, taken together, Mr. Xi and his friends are no match for the U.S. and its array of allies: NATO, Japan, Korea, and Australia, along with other nations fearful of China’s aggression.

• If it came to a fight, I ask myself, how many of Mr. Xi’s friends would join him versus how of the U.S. allies would join America – and if all of Mr. Xi's did, would it make a difference?

[.cmrred]3 | Marxist history to the rescue
Given this relative weakness, Mr. Xi, as a dedicated Marxist, may be counting on history to make up the difference.

• Ever since the Bolsheviks succeeded in Russia (and before, in theory), Marxists have had faith that capitalism will author its own demise – and they are still waiting.

Corollary to this is Mr. Xi’s faith - against all evidence – expressed in his oft-repeated slogan:

• ‘The East is rising, and the West is declining.’

As Peking University’s Wang Jisi notes in  ‘Wang Jisi: Has America declined? Chinese people should have a clear understanding’ [‘王缉思: 美国到底有没有衰落? 中国人应有清醒认识’]:

• ‘Chairman Mao emphasized in 1957 that “the east wind overcomes the west wind”. At that time, China’s view was “the enemy is declining day by day, and we are getting better day by day”.’
• ‘Now we say, “the East is rising, and the West is falling,” which is from the same lineage.’

Speaking of Mao, this reminds me of the song, a paeon to the Chairman and often referred to as China’s unofficial national anthem, ‘The East is Red,’ which begins:

• ‘The east is red, the sun is rising.’

The song is aspirational.

• The East was not Red when the current lyrics were first heard in 1942.
• And, with a couple of exceptions, it is not Red today.

Likewise, the idea of rise and decline goes back to Mao.

• Just as Mao got it wrong, so has Mr. Xi.

For Mr. Xi, ‘The east is rising, and the west is declining’ encapsulates a two-prong approach to that will allow him to make change not seen 100 years. If this is broadly right, he is basing his success on two faulty premises –

1. The East is rising.
2. The West is declining.

Taking the second prong - ‘the West is declining’ - first, I couldn’t disagree more.

• Among those arguing against the West’s decline is John Ikenberry, who notes in ‘Why American Power Endures: The U.S.-Led Order Isn’t in Decline’:

‘The story­line is the same.’

• ‘The United States is slowly losing its commanding position in the global distribution of power.’
• ‘The East now rivals the West in economic might and geopolitical heft, and countries in the global South are growing quickly and taking a larger role on the international stage.’

‘But in truth, the United States is not foundering.’

• ‘The stark narrative of decline ignores deeper world-historical influences and circumstances that will continue to make the United States the dominant presence and organizer of world politics in the twenty-first century.’
• ‘The deep sources of American power and influence in the world persist.’

As for the second prong – ‘the East is rising’ – I couldn’t agree more. But why Mr. Xi is encouraged by this is beyond me.

• The East is rising, all right – rising against China.

In the lead to his essay, ‘How China Lost Asia,’ former South Korean foreign minister, Yoon Young-Kwan, notes:

• ‘China’s efforts to bully its neighbors into acquiescing to its demands and preferences have failed.’
• ‘They have led Asia's democracies to deepen security cooperation with the United States.’

This East is rising, but it’s rising in tacit or direct opposition to China – from just plain fear generated by Mr. Xi himself. As a result,

• Japan is toughening its defenses; Australia’s formally put in with the U.S. and the UK; the Philippines is granting the U.S. more bases; even South Korea and Japan are trying to reconcile in a ‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend’ sort of way - and much more.

A rising East is an obstacle, not an asset, in attaining the change Mr. Xi aspires to make.

• If the East had become Red, China would no doubt have a slew of Asian comrade nations allies. But it didn’t, and he doesn’t.

The East is not rising (at least not in the way Mr. Xi wishes), and the West is not declining.

• If Mr. Xi is indeed waiting for a Marxist history to vindicate his vision and deliver change unseen in 100 years, he will have a long wait – history is not coming.

PART TWO | XI JINPING, AUTOCRAT

Xi Jinping, autocrat and friend of autocrats.

• His reported mission: Make the world safe for autocracy.
• Foe of Joe Biden in Mr. Biden’s Manichean struggle between democracy and autocracy.

There are upstart autocrats who gain power through revolution, coups, subverting democracies, and the like.

• Not Mr. Xi.

He is an autocrat, first, as a believer in the Leninist Chinese Communist Party doctrine.

• And second, as heir to a 2,000-year-old tradition of autocracy - since the Qin Dynasty, 221 B.C., China has had, with few exceptions, a top-down government, headed by a supreme leader, and governed by an all-encompassing bureaucracy.

[.cmrred]1 | The latest in a long line of Chinese autocrats
Decades ago, I read an essay by John King Fairbank that posited that the Chinese Communist Party was really just the latest Chinese dynasty. While I can’t put my hands on the essay, I found the same idea in Dr. Fairbank’s 1989 essay, ‘Keeping up with the New China’:

• ‘The Chinese Communist party dictatorship is historically the successor to two thousand years of sweet-talking despotism by dynastic ruling families.’

More from Dr. Fairbank in his 1989 ‘Why China’s Rulers Fear Democracy’:

• ‘In the twentieth century the institutional successor to family dynasties proved to be Party dictatorship, first as attempted rather loosely under Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang and second as achieved more tightly under Mao Zedong and the CCP.’

And Dr. Fairbank again from ‘From the Ming to Deng Xiaoping’:

• ‘The imperial autocracy, an institution persisting through the Ming, Ch’ing, Republican, and People’s Republic eras….’

‘This autocracy as a point of Chinese cultural distinctiveness is of course surrounded by a host of interconnected characteristics of social structure and values—like the bureaucrat’s need for a superior authority, the patriot’s search for a personal object of loyalty, or the common people’s acquiescence in the ruler’s violence in support of order.’

• ‘China’s culture of today, despite the inflow of foreign influences, retains its identifiable shape and interacting elements.’

Making Xi Jinping the latest in a long line of autocrats - and proud of it.


[.cmrred]2 | ‘Making the world safe for autocracy’
Mr. Xi seems increasingly like an autocrat in the imperial mode (without familial succession)

• But unlike the time when an emperor ruled over the Middle Kingdom, he is faced with adversaries who challenge his autocracy, and he is acting to counter them.

Michael Beckley and Hal Brands highlight both in their essay, ‘China’s Threat to Global Democracy.’

• For the Chinese Communist Party, ‘autocracy is not simply a means of political control or a ticket to self-enrichment.'
• It is ‘a set of deeply held ideas about the proper relationship between rulers and the masses.’

‘This belief in the superiority of an autocratic Chinese model coexists with deep insecurity:’

• ‘The PRC is a brutally illiberal regime in a world led by a liberal hegemon, a circumstance from which the CCP draws a sense of pervasive danger and a strong desire to refashion the world order so that the PRC’s particular form of government is not just protected but privileged.’

‘Chinese leaders feel a compulsion to make international norms and institutions friendlier to illiberal rule.’

• ‘That is why a powerful but anxious Chinese regime is now engaged in an aggressive effort to make the world safe for autocracy and to corrupt and destabilize democracies.’

‘The rulers in Beijing feel that they must wrest international authority away from a democratic superpower with a long history of bringing autocracies to ruin.’

• ‘And as an authoritarian China becomes powerful, it inevitably looks to strengthen the forces of illiberalism—and to weaken those of democracy—as a way to enhance its influence and bolster its own model.’

In a modern world where China has re-emerged with the power to try to reshape the international order, it makes sense that Mr. Xi would do what he can to make the world safe for China’s autocracy.

• And to weaken the opponents who oppose him.

PART THREE | XI JINPING, RESTORER OF THE MIDDLE KINGDOM

Thinking of Xi Jinping, I think of two parts of a line from Hamlet:

• ‘The time is out of joint,’ and
• ‘I was born to set it right.’

Time went of joint in the mid-1800s when China began its ‘Century of Humiliation.’

• And Mr. Xi, with a sense of destiny, seems to feel he was born to set it right.
• (I very much doubt that Mr. Xi would add: ‘O cursed spite’ – he seems to relish his role and the shot it gives him to go down in history as China’s greatest ruler.)

[.cmrred]1 | ‘The time is out of joint.’
John King Fairbank wrote in his 1966 ‘New Thinking About China’:

• ‘Down to the nineteenth century, China was its own world, an enormous, ancient, isolated, unified, and self-sufficient.’

• ‘It preserved a continuity of development in the same area over some three or four thousand years, and had a strong tendency to look inward.’

‘China was the center of the known world and of civilization.’

• ‘Non-Chinese were peripheral and inferior.’
• ‘China was superior to all foreign regions.’

‘The disaster that hit China in the nineteenth century is one of the most comprehensive any people has ever experienced.’

• ‘The ancient tradition of China’s superiority, plus this modern phase of disaster, undoubtedly produced one first-class case of frustration.’
• ‘It could not seem right that a civilization once at the top should be brought so low.’

Mr. Xi seems to feel China’s humiliation and frustration in his bones.

• All this is echoed in his overarching initiative: the China Dream.

[.cmrred]2 | ‘I was born to set it right.’
‘The CCP’s mandate is to set history aright by returning China to the top of the heap’ write Drs. Beckley and Brands.
‘In some ways, China’s bid for primacy in Asia and globally is a new chapter in the history’s oldest story.’

• ‘As countries grow more powerful, they become more interested in reshaping the world.’

• ‘Given how rapidly China’s power has increased over the past four decades, it would be very odd if Beijing was not asserting itself overseas.’

‘Yet China is moved by more than the cold logic of geopolitics.’

• ‘It is also reaching for glory as a matter of historical destiny.’

‘China’s leaders view themselves as heirs to a Chinese state that was a superpower for most of recorded history.’

• ‘A series of Chinese empires claimed “all under heaven” as their mandate and commanded deference from smaller states along the imperial periphery.’

‘In Beijing’s view, a U.S.-led world in which China is a second-tier power is not the historical norm but a profoundly galling exception.’

• ‘That order was created after the Second World War, at the tail end of a “century of humiliation” during which rapacious foreign powers had plundered a divided China.’

Again from Dr. Fairbank:
‘The most remarkable thing about China’s political history is the early maturity of the socio-political order.’

• ‘The ancient Chinese government became more sophisticated, at an earlier date, than any regime in the West.’
• ‘Principles and methods worked out before the time of Christ held the Chinese empire together down to the twentieth century.’

‘The fact that this imperial system eventually grew out of date in comparison with the modern West should not obscure its earlier maturity.’

• All what we might call the ‘institutional memory’ that Mr. Xi draws on today -

China is not groping to find its way or unsure of where it belongs – or doubtful about its role in shaping the world order.

• And Mr. Xi believes he was born to set it right.