‍‘Although the Trump administration has tried to intentionally handcuff its successors, the Biden administration has substantial flexibility to reshape America’s China policy.’

• ‘To successfully transition to a new and more effective China strategy, the various existing measures should not be treated in the same way.’

‘Instead, they can be sorted into four categories (see below figure):'  

1. 'Unilateral Multilateralism'
2. 'Isolate China'
3. 'Bilateral Stabilization'
4. 'Modified Restrictions and Reforms’

'Each of these should be handled differently.’

1. ‘Unilateral Multilateralism’

‘The first group (in blue) is composed of actions the Biden administration should unilaterally eliminate without even engaging in negotiations with others.’

• ‘Reversing these policies will begin the process of repairing those ties and strengthening the United States’ influence in multilateral fora.’

'Fortunately, the Biden administration has signaled that it wants to support the World Trade Organization (WTO) and not undermine it, rejoin the Paris Agreement, maintain U.S. troops in Europe and Asia, rejoin the World Health Organization (WHO), and return to the Iran nuclear deal.'

• 'Taking these steps early will help clarify that the world’s most serious challenge is China, not U.S. allies and the international institutions they helped build.'

2. ‘Isolate China’

‘At the other end of the spectrum (in red), the Biden administration needs to maintain and, in some cases, expand restrictions where Chinese actions are beyond the pale and violate basic principles of human rights, threaten intellectual freedom, or flout the law.’

• ‘The incoming administration should make human rights a presidential priority and expanding restrictions where possible.’
• ‘The administration also needs to maintain restrictions and vigilance on dangerous Chinese behavior within the United States.’

3. ‘Bilateral Stabilization’

‘Although rebuilding confidence among U.S. allies and being tougher on China in certain areas have their challenges, far more complicated are issues that fall in between these extremes, which should be divided into two other separate categories:’

• ‘bilateral stabilization (in green) and modified restrictions and reforms (in purple).’

‘This category includes: rolling back the Section 301 tariffs; ending the tit-for-tat expulsion of journalists; reopening the Houston and Chengdu consulates; ending the dispute over the attempted extradition of Huawei executive Meng Wanzhou and the arbitrary detentions of Canadians Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor; removing the threat to ban WeChat and TikTok; eliminating plans to issue shorter visas for Chinese Communist Party (CCP) members; and restoring the Fulbright and Peace Corps programs in China.’

• ‘These measures have hurt the U.S. economy, eroded U.S. soft power, done little to advance U.S. national security, and damaged the United States’ relationships with allies, all without imposing substantial costs on China.’

‘Removing these policies may help stabilize U.S.-China ties.’

• ‘That said, taking these steps should not be done unilaterally but rather through bilateral negotiations in which China either reciprocates or addresses the U.S. concerns that prompted the restrictions to begin with.’

4. ‘Modified Restrictions and Reforms’

‘The final category of policies, modified restrictions and reforms (in purple), is the thorniest, as it is composed of steps a Biden administration might not have adopted on its own but that nevertheless align with broadly held concerns about the downside risks of both bilateral engagement, particularly with regard to advanced technology, as well as the basic rules defining China’s engagement with the rest of the world.’

‘The Trump administration’s offensive on technology initially centered around a single company, Huawei.’

• ‘Banning its equipment in U.S. 5G networks and restricting exports of certain U.S. technologies to Huawei likely make sense, but over the longer term, the United States and its allies need to develop a comprehensive certification and monitoring system for trusted products and services that applies worldwide, including to Chinese producers.’

‘The United States also needs to reevaluate the benefits and downsides of the “foreign direct product rule” (FDPR), which in this case, starting in May 2020, extended export controls on U.S.-based firms to any company, U.S. or otherwise, producing goods from outside the United States.’

• ‘Invocation of extraterritoriality needs to be done extra carefully because of the effect on U.S. allies and the precedent it sets for others, including China.’

‘The U.S. Commerce Department has added over 400 Chinese companies to its traditional Entity List and another one for military end-users, while the Department of Defense has identified over 40 companies it claims are controlled by the Chinese military.’

• ‘The Biden administration needs to evaluate and set standards that appropriately protect national security, can be implemented together with U.S. allies, and, if adopted by China, would at least in principle not be objectionable.’

‘The Trump administration, through the Department of Justice’s China Initiative, also puts a great deal of energy into rooting out Chinese espionage and cyber theft, particularly directed at U.S. industries and institutions of higher learning.’

• ‘These efforts are sorely needed and will likely have to be expanded.’
• ‘At the same time, it is important to proceed without demonizing any racial group and to not unnecessarily squash academic and research exchanges between the United States and China that help generate new innovations and promote greater Chinese appreciation for the United States, all of which can strengthen U.S. economy and national security.’

‘Finally, although the Trump administration’s frustration with the WTO and other international institutions is understandable, the Biden administration needs to work harder with allies and other like-minded countries to resolve differences, resuscitate the WTO, and have it and other organizations work to the advantage of the United States.’

• ‘Although China has made major headway in making these bodies safe spaces for authoritarian state-capitalist countries, the United States should in no way concede defeat on any of the big substantive issues (e.g., the core importance of market economies and constraints on government interventionism, the multi-stakeholder model for internet governance, and 5G) and operational norms (e.g., transparency, accountability, and staying within defined mandates).’
• ‘An invocation from several years ago in defense of TPP still applies: “If we don’t make the rules, China will.” ’